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🏛️ Governance Challenges within the AEZ - AtomZone Agora #03
Recorded: Sept. 26, 2023 Duration: 1:01:40Space Recording
Full Transcription
All right, everyone, I think we're going to get started.
We might be joined by a couple more people as time goes on, but might as well start talking
now.
So hey, everyone, welcome to AtomZone Agora.
The Agora is a central public space organized and hosted by Atomic Economics and Core Contributors,
where we foster discussions.
In this agora session, we're going to be talking with Contributors from Simply Staking, Composable,
Notional, and Apollo DAO about governance issues within the Atom Economic Zone.
I'm just keeping an eye on our audience.
And so we have folks from Simply Staking, so I'll let them do their introduction if they want to take the mic and speak up.
Hi, hello, everyone, I'm the CEO and co-founder of Simply Staking, I'm the CEO and co-founder of Simply Staking.
We've been a validator in the Cosmos Hub.
We've been a validator in the Cosmos Hub genesis.
We're very, try to be very active within the governance ecosystem.
I think this year we've, we've put up like two or three proposals on the Cosmos Hub.
And yeah, this is a topic that is very much interesting, interesting for us.
So I'm happy that we're discussing.
Hi, everyone.
Thanks for hosting this Haifa team.
My name is Chris.
I'm a contributor to Entry Point, and it's, and it's great to discuss this, this topic with you guys.
Great.
Thanks, guys.
I just invited Isaac to speak.
Not sure if he's taken the mic yet.
But otherwise, we can switch to Bruce from Apollo DAO, if you want to give yourself a quick intro.
Awesome.
Yeah.
So one of the co-founders of Apollo DAO, we were originally launched on Terra back at kind of the peak Terra days, but are now relaunching for Osmosis and Neutron and focusing on yield and liquid-staking derivatives.
So, yeah, I guess kind of our point of view has really been from the kind of coming into the more cosmos ecosystem from the Terra ecosystem, really looking for kind of funding and relaunching and partners and stuff like that.
So, yeah, we've, I feel like, seen quite a lot over the last kind of year or so.
So, yeah, looking forward to kind of hearing others' thoughts and sharing our opinion as well.
Great.
Thanks for joining us, Bruce.
And we've got Isaac on stage now.
So it's your turn to give an intro.
I'm Isaac, CTO at Simply Staking and also involved with the Enterpoint project development and stuff.
Well, what Matthew said about what the company does in the cosmos ecosystem and across the other ecosystems we're active on, I'm happy to answer any questions.
Great.
Good stuff.
If we get a couple more speakers as time goes on, I will drag them on stage and force them to talk about themselves.
But for now, we will power ahead.
And so one of the major topics in Cosmos hub governance around the AEC right now is community pool spends and how those funds are dispersed within the cosmos.
So generally, the structure that we've seen for community pool spend proposals is that money is sent from the community pool to a multisig, which is intended to protect it from being misused by a single person intentionally or otherwise.
And I'm wondering if any of our speakers would like to give us a breakdown of how our current system manages multisigs in community spend proposals.
Yeah, so this year we've had actually, we were one of the teams to be part of such a multisig.
So I don't know which proposal number this was, but we made a proposal on the hub to fund the audit of the cosmos, of the cosmos hub code before neutron joined the AEC.
Yes.
And so what you know, a multisig is sort of a good first step, kind of.
When the whole, when a whole decentralized organization needs to take some action, they can't do it all by themselves, right?
So you want to appoint some people to take decisions on your behalf as long as those decisions make sense and they are in the spirit of what you told them that they should be doing.
So for the audit of the replicated security, we took it as simply staking, we took it on ourselves to go find a security team.
We worked with a few of them, then landed on Oak systems, security, and as part of the decision process, we also like signed agreements with Oak on behalf of the cosmos hub, because the cosmos hub is a decentralized organization, cannot sign things, form and documentation itself.
So I think in this, we highlight a few things, right, that are really important to keep in mind as we continue this discussion, right?
So the cosmos, so a large decentralized organization cannot take, like can take decisions to set direction, but it's very hard for it to do like the real work, right?
So to speak.
And so committees are required to do this.
The analogy would be like in governments in the world, right?
You have a government, it says direction, but then there are ministries and committees, et cetera, that actually do the work.
Now, of course, as soon as you put in like a committee that has a responsibility to do the work, you've introduced failures, kind of places where the system can fail.
So how can it fail, it could fail because the committee does not do what it was, what it told everyone it was going to do.
It could fail because the committee just doesn't achieve what it was going to do.
Maybe it does nothing.
Or it could misspend funds if the committee was responsible for handing out funds, right?
So committees solve kind of a coordination issue, so they're very important.
A multisig, because a committee, so you don't want one person responsible for holding all the funds because you're like a tank vector, the potential for problems there becomes very big.
So you want a few people involved, and this is where the idea of multisigs come in, right?
So I know for proposal to audit the hub code, there was us and three other people in the space.
We're on the multisig and ultimately responsible for sending these funds to Oak Security.
So, yeah, this is kind of how it works right now, but there are some gaps, right, in this system.
So every committee kind of decides how it's going to self-govern, and the Cosmos Hub decides and votes.
The Cosmos Hub community can vote, work on the audit for the Cosmos Hub.
So that's fine.
Then the committee that is doing that has full discretion to work in whichever way it wants.
And most of the time, this works well.
But I want to...
Maybe I stop here and see if that makes sense to people, if there's anything to add, because I went just on a rant, I think.
No, it's good context, and I was just looking at the text for Proposal 687, I think, was the audit.
And looking at your multisig structure for this, I think it was four members, but simply staking wasn't actually on the multisig,
which strikes me as an interesting difference, because a lot of the time we see people making proposals,
and the person or the group making the proposal is also the multisig that is getting funded.
But in this case, it seems like simply staking was doing something because an audit was deemed necessary for replicated security
in addition to the one that Informal was doing.
And they, or you, I should say, coordinated that work without actually touching the flow of money.
I'm curious about the structure of that.
Could you say more to how that decision was made and how it affected the utility of your committee?
So I was not...
So Damien, on our team, took part of this.
And this leads me to another question, another kind of topic that I want to highlight.
So, yeah, so Damien, on our team, was responsible with some other members of the staking team to make these decisions, right?
Discuss with, do the actual work of the committee.
But the actual work of the committee is very different from handing out funds, right?
If you think of a company, right?
There are teams that do the work, and then there's finance that pays people.
So you want to start segregating responsibilities.
As I said before, as soon as you introduce, like, committees, committee members, these are people, right?
And people sometimes fail.
So you need to make sure that there are levels of accountability.
And one of the best ways to do this is to really limit the remits of people in these committees.
So if I'm a decision maker, I should be a decision maker.
I maybe don't need to hold funds.
If funds are going to be distributed as part of a proposal,
then there should be a clear process of explaining, of determining,
have the right criteria been met for these funds to be now distributed by the people who are responsible for handling these funds.
But again, these, and I think it's a subject that we should be, that we're going to discuss,
and I know, Lexa, that you wrote about this.
It's like the separation of concerns, right, with people involved in the system.
And, yeah, continue on then.
Yeah, that is a topic I'm really interested in.
What you've said makes sense to me,
that decision makers don't necessarily directly need to hold the funds.
And I think that highlights the interesting idea that actually dispersing the money is not terribly complicated.
You know, it's transactions, it's signing things using your wallet.
But the actual decision making itself can be incredibly complex.
You need access to a lot more information.
And in order to process that information, you need a lot of time, you need context, you need energy to do that sort of work.
So when you, I guess, overlap the responsibilities of the decision maker and what I think of more as an operational role,
you know, kind of like a finance department just sending the money,
I think you run into the risk that people are overloaded or you are over-indexing on people being good decision makers or good operational support.
And, you know, I don't think you can optimize on two fronts at once.
I think it's a really interesting problem to figure out who holds what responsibility on the committee or in the entire flow.
Yeah, for sure.
And as you add, so I'm going to give another example, right?
So I'd like to discuss, we discussed the audit proposal where things went well,
and I'd like to discuss a proposal where I think things did not go that well,
and how separating concerns could have really improved the process, right?
So I'm sure everyone on the call recalls proposal 72 that asked the Cosmos Hub for funds to distribute to teams
who are planning and incentivize them to research and plan how they could work within the atom economic zone
and how to use interchange security, which was something that was still nascent as an idea about a year ago, right?
So what happened there?
There was a committee that was responsible for selecting these teams to hand out funds to,
and we were one of the teams selected.
We did, we did the work, but then when it came to actually get the funds, these funds were not given to us.
And so this is where, like, this is where it can really go wrong, right?
So the hub asked a team or entrusted a team to do some work.
This team was meant to do some work, promised other entities in this space for funds on behalf of the Cosmos Hub,
and then these promises were not made, were not kept, and the funds were not distributed.
And within this, within the setup that was used for proposal 72,
you start to see, like, the co-mingling of decision-making and operational teams.
And this immediately causes problems, right?
So when you start separating teams, decision-making versus operational,
you introduce requirements for reporting that are extremely important.
So a decision-maker has to make sure that they write down and document the decisions
so that then the team that is handing out the funds
actually can make sure that the funds are going to be given to the teams
based on the right decisions, right?
When these two teams are the same, well, then it's extremely hard to get accountability, right, in the system.
Because you're wearing, you're the same person wearing two hats.
And that never works in real life.
Or it can work, but it's hard.
And we understand that this is hard because, like, as part of the blockchain revolution,
it's this idea to build better transparent systems
because when we understand that the current systems don't work.
So, yeah, I wanted to give these kind of two examples, right,
of how things could go well, and most of the time,
and the proposals that we've seen, right, on the Cosmos Hub, things go well.
But there are edge cases, and we have to be very careful of these,
to build systems that don't allow for these edge cases.
And I'll say just this, and then pass on the mic.
I think, I think, a very, very, very, very important aspect of any committee, any multisig,
whichever the structure, is transparency.
At the end of the day,
we, as humans, lose faith in the systems that are governing us,
not because, like, not because of the people in governance, right?
These come, they go, they change.
Unfortunately, what happens, after all, this change is everything stays the same,
and it stays the same because there's lack of transparency.
And so I want to highlight this, as I feel one of the most fundamental points
that we should be striving to achieve.
Yeah, that's a good point.
And I think it's really interesting that you're comparing these two different proposals
because I recall the discussions around each of them.
And structurally, they seem pretty similar
in that there is a multisig that is responsible for dispersing funds
from the community pool to what I view as a customer to the hub,
whether it's the consumer chains who were receiving support funding
or Oak Security, who is hired to do an audit.
But in the case of Prop 687,
there was a lot of discussion on the hub about exactly which audit company
was going to be hired.
And we saw people debating the merits and making cases for various companies.
And by the time the proposal went on chain,
there was a name.
People knew exactly who was being hired.
And so the role of the multisig then was extremely operational.
Whereas I believe in Proposal 72,
it wasn't entirely clear which chains were going to receive support.
And so that decision-making information
was not as transparent throughout the process.
And I hear what you're saying about this idea of reporting
and having someone try to wear two hats.
And if you are doing both roles,
why would you need to write it down?
You know what you're thinking.
This open, transparent communication
only becomes necessary
when you're trying to communicate with another person
or with the community.
So I hear what you're saying about
wanting to separate out these tasks
in the name of transparency.
I think we just got another person on stage.
We got a couple more people.
We'll take a quick pause for introductions
from Jacob and Brain Jar maybe.
Oh, sure.
I'm going to do like a slightly long introduction,
but then I'm probably going to just mute myself
because I probably have a terrible connection.
So, hey, I'm Jacob,
CEO at Notional Labs.
And Lexa, you are right
to call out the proposal
that funded Oak Security
to do that audit
as one of,
in my opinion,
like,
it's one of the best
Casual Soft Governance proposals.
Yeah,
that was a good one.
Also,
I'd like to mirror
the thought
that,
and by the way,
I think there really is
some questions
between
like small groups
and then having
everybody decide
on everything.
And now, guys,
I'm just going to mute myself
because I'm
way up in the mountains
right now.
And thank you.
All right.
Well,
the Internet gods
have silenced Jacob
for now.
Brainjar,
would you like
to introduce yourself?
Yeah,
hey, guys,
I'm Brainjar,
CEO of Composable.
We're focused
on expanding IBC.
yeah,
just happy to be here
and chat a little bit
about what we think
could be improved upon.
I think
about
Proposal 687,
high compliments
from Jacob,
one of the best
governance proposals
ever.
And I'm inclined
to agree.
I thought it was
a really admirable process.
It was wonderful
to watch that happen
and watch people
have such nuanced,
open discussions
about the quality
of work that we were
interested in funding
for the hub.
And that level
of transparency,
accountability,
professionalism
in our governance
processes,
you know,
it makes the hub
look good.
It makes it look
like we're able
to cooperate.
We're getting things
done.
We're communicating
and having good,
productive conversations.
On the other hand,
when we can't
be transparent
in our governance
and the accountability
process is not clear,
I think we take
a reputational hit
as a community
and as a chain
in our governance
process.
And folks
from the contributors
to EntryPoint,
if you would like
to speak to
your opinion
of how this sort
of thing affects
the reputation
of the hub
as folks
who have been
involved
in both sides
of it.
I'd be happy
to comment
on this
in particular.
EntryPoint
contributors
used
the fact
that we
had been
awarded
at least
on paper
some funds
to start
to build
and properly
identify
technical
applications
for replicator
security
and try
and solve
some
medium-term
and long-term
problems
associated
with the
Cosmos hub,
especially with
respect to
its revenue
generation
problem.
And so
EntryPoint
contributors
came up
with a plan
as to how
to execute
and indeed
we engineered
a solution
and invested
a lot of
resources.
And this
was all
based on
a verbally
awarded
amount of
funds.
We then
went on
to speak
to third
parties
in the
venture capital
community
to try
and seek
funds
and then
also stated
that EntryPoint
was a project
that had
been backed
by the
Cosmos hub
as part
of Prop
And this
further lent
credibility
replicated
security,
the Cosmos
hub projects
and EntryPoint
as well.
And to
have been
told that
actually you
wouldn't be
awarded the
Prop
72 funds
later on
and that
was not
even a
direct,
you know,
we weren't
even directly
informed that.
That's a loss
of credibility
and I think
it hinders
a lot of
people who
are preparing
you know,
deploy their
own time
and their
resources,
it would
be a
significant
hindrance
to be
rugged in
that way,
in my
opinion.
And speaking
to other
projects,
you know,
EntryPoint
is not the
only victim
that has
fallen to
this situation.
There are
many projects
that have
actually been
rugged in
this way.
Yeah,
the financial
implications
to projects
which go
through that
are pretty
clear.
It's not a
good situation
for anyone
and it
means that
as an
entity,
the hub
could gain
a reputation
for not
being able
to follow
through on
its funding
processes.
And this
is one of
the ideas
that I
was thinking
about when
I published
my oversight
spec on
the Cosmos
Hub forum.
And this
is a spec
that takes
into consideration
that really
it's the
Cosmos Hub
community that
should be
making governance
decisions like
this, especially
about our
community pool.
I mean, that
money is for
the hub
community, it's
for Atom
token holders
to decide
what to do
with it.
And one
of the
main principles
that I
focused on
in this
spec idea,
which is
very loose,
it's meant
to be a
starting point
for people
to talk about
governance and
the idea of
optimistic
governance where
the community
makes a
decision and
then assumes
that the
people they're
funding, we
believe in
them, we
think they're
going to do
their work, we
don't feel like
they're necessarily
going to run
away with the
money, this is
kind of a
catchphrase that
gets thrown
around a lot
because it's
like a
catastrophic
failure if a
team that's
been funded
just runs
away.
But instead
of having a
multi-sig, the
idea that's
really been on
my mind is a
vesting wallet
where that money
is already sent
to the team
that we're
funding and
it's no
human person,
it's no
fallible
person with
decision-making
skills who
needs to
continue the
funding that's
been granted
by the
community.
It's that the
money just
gradually is
released through
this vesting
wallet and
in our
current SDK
version on
the Cosmos
Hub, I
believe we
can only do
continuous
vesting.
I would love
to see it
done in
other
epochs, I
think that
would work
really nicely.
But this
removes the
human decision
making that
a small
multi-sig
imparts on
the process
and I
think puts
it back in
the hands
of the
hub community.
I know
folks from
Entry Point
and Simply
Staking have
chatted with
me a bit
about that
spec.
I'm wondering
if you would
like to share
any of your
thoughts about
that optimistic
governance idea.
So, I
think there
are like two
sides of
this.
First of
all, that
the funds
are vested
really makes
sense.
getting to
a system
where the
community
has ultimate
veto power,
that things
go wrong
is really
important,
right?
If we
actually get
there,
it would
be a
really great
achievement
from our
end,
right?
As a
community.
What's
and I
think the
point of
your proposal,
right?
Apart from
making sure
that, like,
so if you
have
vesting
periods,
right?
When you
introduce a
vesting
period,
you should
understand
how and
why it's
going to
unvest and
what are the
criteria that
need to be
met before
something
unvests.
and you
can't get to
those criteria
unless you
have clear
stages of
how success
is measured
and clear
decision
points,
right,
in this
process.
So I
like it
because it
forces also
the team
that is
doing
work to
think of
how their
work is
going to
be measured.
And then
not just
that,
then you
have to
report on
how this
work was
actually achieved
because if you
don't report,
these things
don't invest,
you don't get
the money.
So I
think in
this,
the most
important is
to add
these touch
points,
right,
for people.
Clear,
clear points
of either
decisions that
need to be
taken or
quality of
work that
needs to
be met
before
funds are
distributed.
I am
not 100%
sure whether
an oversight
committee is
necessarily
required.
I feel
that
possibly
you can
just write.
Like,
if I say
I have a
project and
it's,
these are
the milestones,
milestones one,
two, and
three.
For every
time I want
funds,
I just
report on
how I
achieve the
milestones,
I don't
need that
there's,
I don't
think that
there needs
to be a
committee
to define
these
milestones,
like,
to make
sure that
I met
these
milestones.
obligation
should be
I report
transparently
that these,
like,
on my
progress
towards these
milestones.
And I,
my suspicion
is that
as a
community,
there's
always going
to be at
least one
person who
is going
to go and
check them
out.
And if
things are
not done
well,
well,
you're going
to have
problems,
right,
whoever is
trying to
cheat the
system.
I'm not
saying you
shouldn't
have a
committee.
saying,
because it's
when you
add a
committee,
it's like
another team
of people
that you
need to
worry about
and to
make sure
that they
don't end
up colluding
in some
way with
the people
handling the
money or
building the
project.
so maybe
you can
use both
types of
systems.
Sometimes you
really need a
committee,
sometimes you
just don't
need to and
you just
publish things
on a
forum post
at regular
intervals.
Yeah,
I like that.
A committee is
just another
group of
people you
need to
worry about.
That's a
great sound
bite.
I think
there's no
one-size-fits-all
approach to
oversight or
accountability.
I think the
principles are
pretty simple
and clear.
The decision
makers need
to know
what's going
on in
order to
fuel good
decision
making.
There are
plenty of
streams of
work where
that information
is not
complex.
It could be
easily reported,
easily understood,
and easily
used to
make decisions
about fund
release.
This is
way back
in, well,
not way back,
it's like a
year back in
the governance
archives, but
one of the
first proposals
that Haifa put
up was Prop
63, which
was about
improving the
Hub governance
forum, which
I think went
pretty well.
That was a
very small
amount of
Adam, and
we were
essentially
dispersing it
to people
who were
doing small
amounts of
work that
we thought
would improve
Hub governance.
It's the
amount of
Adam that
is really
not worth
getting the
whole community
involved in.
Maybe that's
controversial to
say, but I
think deciding
things about
50 Adam at
a time is
just not a
good use of
the community's
time.
The reporting
on work at
that level was
pretty simple.
either you
have built
a Telegram
bot or
you have
not, and
so that's
a very easy
structure to
manage, but
when you get
into work that
costs millions
of dollars and
is extremely
complex, as
much software
development is,
a reporting
structure becomes
more important
and it becomes
much harder for
the entire
community to
make good
decisions based
on what can
often be complex
information.
And that's
the place
where I think
a committee
or some
sort of
intermediary
expertise point
is really
useful.
Not necessarily
that these
people are
better positioned
to make
decisions for
the community,
but that they
can help
translate for
the community
that they're
part of.
I have this
awful drawing
that might make
it onto the
forum at some
point, we'll
see, that
essentially
imagines the
community as
sort of an
amorphous blob
where an
oversight
committee's
job is not
to break
away from
that amorphous
community blob,
but to
extend it, to
reach forwards
like an arm
that is attached
to a central
entity, and to
get a little bit
closer to the
work and make
sure that they
understand the
work that has
been done, and
then report
back to the
rest of their
body to make
sure that the
body is able
to make good
decisions.
And I imagine
that sort of
oversight being
really effective
for long-term
work that is
meant to take
many months
or even
years, whereas
shorter time
frame work you
could do very
simply reporting
directly to the
community, yes,
I've done the
work, no, I
haven't done the
work.
That's a lot of
me on my
soapbox, talking
about my
governance
opinions.
I'm wondering
if there are
any other
ideas for
changes to
governance, to
reporting and
transparency, to
multi-state
management, that
folks think would
improve hub
governance the
way we see it
right now.
And we have a
lot of speakers
on stage, but
this is also
open to the
audience.
I think we're
getting to about
the last 15
minutes, and so
if anyone has
thoughts or
comments, I'd
love to hear
them.
I think one
of the...
Oh, sorry,
go on.
Yeah, I just
wanted to chime
I think that
there is a
lot that can be
learned from
Polkadot's
OpenGov
setup.
It's incredibly
controversial
because, you
know, there
will be teams
that deliver,
you know, one
milestone, and
they deliver a
second milestone,
and it's perhaps
not up to par
with the
community.
Like, people
actually vote
no, and, you
know, the
project just gets,
like, completely
canceled.
So, OpenGov
is a framework
where there is
so much
granularity around
payments that
really gives a
lot of power
to the
community.
For better or
for worse, I
think it's just
a model worth
looking at.
I think more
granularity than
anything else is
one of the
biggest values of
that system.
I personally
second that.
I think the
community, like
the Cosmos
Hub community
would do
well to
have a look
at OpenGov.
I think they've
done very good
work within
the ecosystem.
Bruce, I'm
going to put
you on the
spot.
You got cut
off and
graciously gave
up your time
on stage.
So, can I
pull you back
in to hear
what you
were going
to say?
Yeah, of
course.
Yeah, just
make sure we
all finish
on that.
Yeah, I
think kind
of just
having a
completely
separate
point, but
kind of
having more
clarity for
the teams
that are going
through this
the governance
process as
well, whether
it's kind
of requesting
funds for
an audit or
kind of ongoing
development.
I think just
kind of having
more understanding
or being able
to provide more
understanding to
the teams of
exactly what
they've got to
go through,
what's required
of them,
what kind of
they need to
invest in this.
Because I think
it needs to be
transparency, like
it's been said
for the community,
but I think also
kind of for these
teams, like how
are these
decisions made,
kind of why
are they made,
it's not always
clear, you can
kind of go
through some
of these
processes, you
can put a lot
of time, energy
into it and a
lot of direction
and kind of
come out with
either a no or
maybe or not
even kind of
hearing back.
And I think it
can sometimes be
hard to know
kind of how to
improve and
kind of what
went well.
And I think it
is kind of a
bit of a maze
going through
these decisions.
And I think
it's also tough
within kind of an
ecosystem where
everyone kind
of knows each
other to some
degree as well.
So I think, yeah,
just kind of clarity
for the team side
and transparency
for the team side
as well is always
helpful.
But maybe that's a
bit of a bias to
you.
I think that
actually raises a
really interesting
point because it's
good for teams to
have clarity on
what's expected of
them and it's
important for the
community to have
transparency from
the teams.
But in this
decentralized
governance arena,
who can provide
clarity to the
teams?
this is kind
of the starting
point that I
have been thinking
about when thinking
about reporting is
that, you know,
it's not like we're
in school and your
teacher says, this
is the report
format, follow it
and you'll be fine.
It's wide open.
All the
possibilities are
there and the
teams and the
whole community have
to work together to
find a structure that
works for both of
them.
It's like you engage
in this meta
process of
governance before you
even make it into,
you know, on-chain
deciding whether or
not to get funded
before that.
It's, is this
reporting structure
going to work for
both of us?
Is this a project we
can engage in with
this level of
transparency,
rather, and
reporting?
And that discussion
is one that often,
I think, goes in a
direction that escapes
the scope of the
project at hand.
I've heard people
talking about the
idea of global
committees,
or domain-specific
committees on the
hub, which I think
is a fascinating
idea, but it's so
hard to have a
coherent conversation
about that within the
scope of a single
proposal, like that
would need to be its
own, its own
proposal, instead of
being attached to an
individual team's
funding proposal.
I would be very
curious to see
someone take those
ideas forward as
independent proposals
and try to
structure some
kind of larger
oversight structure
or standards for
the hub.
I think the other
thing for me, and
kind of connected to
that as well, is
kind of where are
the decisions being
made?
Because I think this
kind of shifts quite
a lot depending on
what the proposal is.
I mean, even kind of
it was kind of
discussed earlier in
regards to the
audit, was it kind
of more of a just
kind of a, like, is
the committee kind
of just providing
kind of gathering
information and then
providing it to the
community who then
votes or is it kind
of the committee
making the decisions
or does the
committee make the
kind of first three
decisions and then
it's kind of passed
I know it can't, it's
obviously going to be
very slow if the
community is making
every decision.
But yeah, I think
it's also kind of
needs to be kind of
balanced around
kind of, yeah, who's
making decisions and
where is that kind of
power reside.
But yeah, I think
it's a very tough
one to solve.
I'm feeling a lot of
pressure to keep
talking.
We've had an awfully
quiet audience, so I
am forced to assume
that we're either doing
a great job or, no,
that's the assumption
I'll make.
We're doing a great
job talking about
governance, cheers
all around.
Yeah, we should just
keep chatting.
I think they're
enjoying themselves
because no one's
left.
So, let's not be
that bad.
Yeah, I think, I
think to Bruce's
point, yeah, it's
very important.
I feel like a lot
of this can be
solved when at
the, at the,
when you're making
a proposal on
chain to, you're
going to do
something, right, on
the hub of the
Cosmos hub.
Perhaps at that
point in time, a
lot more thought
needs to be given
around how am I
going to keep
myself accountable?
how am I going
to, like, what
teams can expect
from me?
And I know
back in 2020,
there was, like,
an effort to
really, like, to
try and set
clarity around
how to submit
proposals on the
hub, how to,
how to structure
these, what are the
minimum requirements,
like, it needs
to be on the
forum for two
weeks, and there
should have been
some discussion
around it.
Perhaps just
improvements on
those, like,
processes and
clarification and
set them up and
enforce them,
right?
A proposal, if
you, if you're
asking for funding,
you don't get,
like, you, you
don't get funds
unless you have
very clear, like,
ways of clarifying
how you're going
to be held
accountable.
Because it's
easy to ask for
funds, right?
But everyone
hates being,
everyone has the
extra paperwork,
I guess.
But it's the,
the extra
bureaucracy and
paperwork that
needs, that
needs to be, to,
to be clarified,
right?
Full disclosures
of conflicts of
interest.
And this is
one of the
trickiest
problems to
solve, because
as a small
community,
well, we're
always going to
have some
amount of
conflict of
interest, right?
So, if, if
there's someone,
let's say,
proposal 687,
was it?
That was done
by us, as
simply stated.
But the person
who wrote it,
is Damien.
We need to
disclose that we
are validators,
and maybe,
like, part of
our, like,
people need to
know, right,
that we're going
to do this,
that, that,
that, that we're
doing it, and we
might have some
sort of
conflict of
interest.
and one
thing I, one
last, just
very briefly, I
wanted to add
is continuity.
What happens
if someone
started out
working on a
proposal, right,
for the
Cosmos hub?
well, let's
say, let's
take our
example of
proposal 687,
right?
What if Damien
left the
company?
What happens
then?
Is he doing
the proposal
on behalf of
simply staking?
Is it on
him by
himself?
And in
both cases,
the disclosures
change, right?
And I think
something like
this happened
in Proposal 72
as well, where
Yelena left
informal, so
then someone
dropped from
a multi-sig.
So these are,
these are the
things that we,
I feel we need
processes to,
to add, it's
just bureaucracy,
but it has to
be done, right,
to add, like,
processes, so
these are clear
beforehand,
even, as
Bruce said,
they're clear
for the teams
asking for
fun.
I'll stop
because I'll
ramble forever.
It's a,
it's a fair
point.
We also got
Noam and
Effort Capital
on stage with
Yeah, what's
Interesting
conversation.
I'm Noam,
for those who
don't know me,
I work at
Binary Builders.
I received a
grant from
the AA DAO
to do some
work on
the,
future of
the hub,
token economics.
But one
specific thing
that we're
working on
that I thought
would be
interesting to
mention is
something that
we call the
Developer Revenue
Incentivization
Program, or
short for the
DRIP.
And it's sort
of like, you
know, that
problem that
was discussed
earlier in
this call,
in this
space, about
the vesting
issues that
occur, and
how do we
do accountability,
and so we're
thinking of an
infrastructure
design, where
basically you
do a proposal
to request a
percentage of
the inflation,
but that
percentage is
variable based
on the
actual USD
value of
Adam.
So let's
say I want
to ask for
somewhere between
2 million and
4 million, that
would be about
0.17% of the
hub's yearly
budget.
Then every day
we see, okay,
how much is
Adam actually
worth?
And then if
Adam is worth
a lot, we
give that team
less Adam.
If Adam isn't
worth very much,
we give them
more Adam, but
of course that's
capped to a
maximum percentage.
And there's a
bunch more to
We're putting
that in the
forum.
This week,
probably tomorrow
soonish.
But I think
it's an
interesting thing
to explore.
And I've been
curious to hear
what people
think about
that when
we get there
on the
forum, what
encouraged
participation
there.
But on the
topic of
I've been
talking to
Effort Capital,
David, maybe
you can go
ahead and talk
about this,
but how do
we figure
out what's
the right
process for
requesting
funding?
How do
we do it?
Because you
have this
issue right
now where
the first
team that
comes,
gets the
funding?
Great,
they get
funding.
And another
team comes
and they're
like, oh,
we already
funded this
team.
And then what
are we going
to do now?
And so how do
we navigate
this?
And David,
you have some
thoughts on this,
so maybe we can
talk about that.
I don't know.
Yeah, thanks,
Noam.
Yeah, I mean,
really just to,
I guess,
we're going to
say what Noam
already said,
but I think
one of the
things we need
to change is
how we,
not only just
the templates
for how we
request funding,
but the life
cycle or the
cycle for
spend props
in general.
Everything we're
doing right now
is very ad hoc.
A proposal goes
up on the
forums, we
talk about it
for a month,
and then the
community decides,
do we want to
fund this or do
we not want to
fund this?
If we're
trying to build
the future
of on-chain
institutions,
if we're
trying to
build the
future of
decentralized
coordination,
we need to
be more
strategic.
There's actually
a lot of
lessons learned
we can take
from corporations.
I'm not saying
all chains are
corporations,
but I think
there's a lot
of lessons learned
we can gather
from them to
figure out how
to better be
more agile,
be more
strategic and
effective as
a DAO or
as a larger
community.
One thing
that corporations
do is yearly
budget cycles.
Maybe a yearly
budget cycle is
too much in
the current
fast-paced
environment of
crypto, but I
think we need
to get more
strategic.
Every year,
there's a
certain quarter,
let's say Q4
this year,
the community
decides how
much money do
we actually want
to allocate to
core development,
to grants,
to certain
budgetary line
items.
In theory,
it'd be great
if all these
teams, if there
was multiple
grants teams that
came and proposed
like, hey,
here's our
team, here's
how much we
want to spend
on this, we
have multiple
core development
teams coming in
and requesting
funds, and
then there's
kind of like a
request for
quote where the
community goes
out, and I
think Neutron's
doing a really
great job with
this.
I know Spade
wrote a whole
forum post on
the Neutron
forums page
putting out the
request for quote
for core services
like relaying, for
example.
Not only does
this incentivize
competition, I
think it allows
us to have
better capital
allocation across
these core areas.
Right now, all
we do is we
send money into
one large fund,
the community
pool, and it's
not used
strategically.
There's a lack
of accountability,
there's a lot of
distrust, but I
think if we
started bucketing
the community
pool into
certain areas, and
we also had
better tooling like
vesting wallets,
which I heard
obviously a lot of
discussion around
today, I think
we'd be able to
have more
accountability, we'd
be able to
probably allocate
our spend better,
and I think
overall we'd
just get a
better well-run
community hub
pool, and
overall better
output from
the handful of
teams that are
trying to make
sure the hub
succeeds.
I think we
need to get
back to basics.
We need to
get to yearly
budget cycles, we
need to get to
requests for
quotes, it's not
first come, first
serve, like
Noam said, but
we're actually
incentivizing
competition for
core services
that the hub
needs.
And again,
back to
everyone else's
point, we need
to get better
at creating
templates and
processes for
what does
spend proposals
look like, how
do we report
back to the
community, obviously
there's a lot
of conversation
about domain
specific or
global committees,
I'm more of the
opinion that we
need to get to
domain specific
committees, but
at the end of
the day, what it
boils down to is
however this
process looks like,
the community
ultimately needs
to have final
say and have
the ability to
veto, remove
funding, or remove
committee members
in the event
that they ever
feel like
there's
misappropriation
of funds or
they're not
being properly
served by the
service providers
that they elect
as part of
these committees.
That is, I think,
core to the ethos
of crypto and
decentralized
accountability.
As long as the
community ultimately
has power to
veto or remove
funding, I think
that's the premise
we need to start
off with, but
there's a lot of
work to do
regardless.
Yeah, that's
very well said.
I mean, I
always love
hearing your
thoughts on
governance and
this sort of
structure.
I think your
essays on the
forum are a
great read for
anyone interested
in thinking about
this topic.
It's been out
for a while, so
I imagine people
have read it.
But the, yeah,
the idea of
back to basics
and needing
to start with
a budget that
we can all
give thoughts
to, dividing
up that massive
community pool
into categories
so we can make
better strategic
decisions as a
group, 100%
agree.
We are drawing
up to the end
of our time, so
I will take one
last call for
anyone with any
burning thoughts
they want to
share.
After a nice
awkward pause, I
see no burning
thoughts, so I
assume we've all
gotten it out of
our system and
this will be our
last governance
discussion.
Glad we've solved
so many problems.
So thanks everyone
for coming out to
this Atom Zone
Agora session on
governance issues
in the Atom
Economic Zone.
I think we had
some really great
discussion, heard a
lot of viewpoints,
contrasts, and
compares about
various proposals
that we've seen
and hopefully we
can all come away
with this with
some thoughts.
Hopefully we'll
see some interesting
tweets, essays, and
thought pieces on
the things we've
discussed today and
how we can move
forward in hub
governance and
improve our
processes and the
way that we spend
our community pool
money.
So thanks everyone
for coming out and
hopefully we'll see
you again at
another Atom Zone
Agora.
