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Governance Changes Coming To Telos
Recorded: April 25, 2025 Duration: 0:48:51Space Recording
Short Summary
Telos is set to revolutionize its governance model with the introduction of EVM voting, scalable pay for block producers, and self-staking mechanisms. These innovations aim to enhance user engagement, incentivize active participation, and ensure that the best validators are rewarded, ultimately driving growth and adoption within the ecosystem.
Full Transcription
Thank you. All right, all right.
Good morning.
Good afternoon, good evening.
How's it going?
Good morning, good afternoon, good evening.
Thanks for joining.
Let's give a few minutes let's
see for anybody else that wants to join Thank you. All right, well, I think we can get started. Thanks for joining everybody. This is a pretty exciting space that we're planning to have today. We have Jesse, our CTO on the line, and we're going to be going through some governance changes, some interesting updates.
Thanks for joining us, Jesse.
Of course. Always happy to talk about Telos.
Yeah, same here.
So why don't we get started?
One of the first topics I have on the agenda is EVM voting,
something everybody's been pretty eager and excited about.
I know you've been working on it,
and this is pretty much a game changer for the Telos ecosystem.
So what new updates do you have for us?
Sure. So what, you know, EVM voting's not necessarily a,
it didn't really require a governance vote, right?
It's pretty clear users of the EVM should have equal access to voting as users on the native network always have.
So EVM voting has been something we've been kind of thinking about how we would do that.
It's really kind of a hard thing to do because on the native network, voting is complicated.
And so to add in the ability to vote from the EVM is a tricky one.
And so we did come up with a design last year that we felt was good.
But then, of course, implementing something takes its own chunk of time so with the recent um so there's a list of other changes that have been
proposed through the telos decide governance engine and the uh vote passed so now we're presented with um changes that we need to make on the native side, which it makes sense because upgrades to,
you know, a network, especially critical ones like this, they, they take some effort.
There's a lot of testing we have to do, et cetera. So it just made sense to us that we should
tackle both the new governance changes, which we'll get into here, as well as including EVM
voting in those changes at the same time, uh, while we're working
in the same part of the code and going through the whole upgrade and testing cycle.
Um, so, so yeah, we've been working on EVM voting and all of the other changes.
Um, progress is going well, um, getting to the point where, um, we got to start
thinking about, you know, adding it into
the wallet so people can actually access the functionality and, you know, when we might be
able to do the upgrade. So it's pretty exciting for sure. And I think we'll, we have a lot of
the validators and a lot of people that participate in Telus governance or a lot of people that are
on the EVM and watch Telus governanceance but don't get a chance to participate,
that now will be able to participate through the EVM voting.
I think all that's everybody's really excited about.
And it's going to shake things up for VPs.
Hopefully some of the changes that we'll talk about here
are really going to improve some of the voting and
validator selection, you know, problems or things that need improving.
So, yeah, that's one of the most exciting parts, right?
That now we participation is going to increase from the EVM ecosystem.
People that have been, you know,
they've been on the sidelines not being able to vote.
So this is bound to kind of change some of the block producer structure, right?
Like now you're going to have a lot more people voting,
a lot more people having a voice and trying to change things up,
voting for block producers that
are more effective it's probably going to increase accountability and potentially performance because
now um you know where a lot of our activity is on the evm to have those people participate in
governance like that should be that should cause a big shift in, in,
in block producer votes. So I think I'm, I'm pretty excited. I think the community is pretty
excited about this. It's, it's a big change that we, we needed to have and we're excited to have
finally. Yeah, no, absolutely. And, you know, a lot of people come to Telos and they just see Telos as a fast, high-performant EVM, all the great attributes that the Telos EV to the evm they can participate in validator
selection um you know just like they could on other evms um so it's almost like a table stakes
situation here for for an evm to have users of the evm accessing governance um so this is the
first step in that direction. It will include validator
voting. It will not include the governance proposals yet. That's going to have to come
as a second phase. We didn't want to try to bite off too much. And validator selection
is definitely a bit more important than the governance. Not that the governance proposals
aren't important, but validator selection was the priority.
So we will observe how that all works once it's deployed and we can then take that strategy and apply it to the...
I think we lost you there, Jesse. Are you still there?
Yeah, sorry.
I think somebody tried to call me and it killed me.
Can you hear me now?
Yeah, much better.
Okay.
So, yeah, I was just saying that, you know, the side governance engine is separate from
the validator selection.
So it's a separate implementation that's going to come in a second phase.
This will just be EVM voting.
Got it.
Got it.
Okay.
That makes sense.
Yeah, that was follow up to my next question on like, you know, what voting features are going to be implemented.
features are going to be implemented and you kind of cleared that up for us.
And you kind of cleared that up for us.
I guess to wrap things up on the EVM voting and the potential of it, can this open the
door for more DeFi native governance tools on Telos?
Do you see this being worked into protocols, dApps?
Would they be able to take advantage of this in any way in the future?
I mean, maybe not now, but where do you kind of see this going?
Yeah, I mean, the pattern that we're using here, and I don't want to get too technical
on the weeds, but the way that the EVM and native kind of coexist is that the EVM is a smart contract that's deployed on native.
So from the perspective of Telos zero, Telos native, it's just another smart contract.
And so Telos native can invoke functions on smart contracts on the EVM. So native can, you know, from native,
you can call any of the solidity contracts on the EVM. But the EVM can't really kind of penetrate
out. It's like a one way street, where things can go into the EVMm but the evm can't call the native contracts the
evm is not really aware of native evm is kind of in its own little bubble so um the way that this
evm voting is working is that it's all one directional still and um and it's there's there's
some projects already on telos um that are doing basically the same thing.
So, you know, the Feed Your Monkey game and Boyd
and some of the Benefy team and Kudo.
These are folks that have built on native
and have been around, you know, projects running on native
that want access to the EVM.
So they've kind of instructed them on the strategy and they've built different ways for their tokens to move in and out of the EVM. So they've kind of instructed them on the strategy
and they've built different ways for their tokens
to move in and out of the EVM.
So the possibilities here that this really opens up,
it becomes a pattern that we can follow
that we can follow for any interoperability between EDM and native.
for any interoperability between EVM and native.
And so it's really hopefully going to become a really good example
of how you can interoperate the two and what's possible.
There's certainly, for me, some designs in mind
for a generic token bridge between the two,
because there's a lot of potential on native for different use cases that don't fit very well in
the EVM. Native is gasless. There's no fees. There's just a lot of potential there. And then
the EVM, as we all know, has so much user base and liquidity and,
you know, all of the tokens that are bridged through Stargate. It's all there. So being able
to like kind of grab the best of both worlds by creating interoperability between the two,
I think is a huge amount of potential for Telos, Telos, driving more DeFi activity inside the EVM,
and then driving more of maybe the use cases
that fit better on native,
but maybe those can be using some of these tokens
that come out of the EVM.
And because they're the same network,
there's no bridge in between them, it's all on chain,
there's instant redemption between the and, and near zero costs, except for maybe a gas fee
on the EVM to like send the token across to native. So, um, there's just a lot
of potential there that I do feel could, you know, not, not that it isn't
possible today. And like I said, some people are already doing it, but I think
this can, um, you know, maybe open up the minds and, you know, introduce some ideas for people that would also continue to grow that interoperability between the two.
So it's definitely, it's certainly exciting.
Like as far as like use cases for interoperability, EVM voting's, you know, near the top.
EVM voting is near the top.
It's a critical one for the network, for the protocol.
It's a critical one for the network, for the protocol.
And apps can also do the same thing.
And all the code will be fully open source,
and they can see how we've done it and follow suit.
Yeah, no, it's super interesting.
And it's interoperability between the two.
And I think it's almost like, not to dumb it down,
but it's almost like you know to not to dumb it down but it's almost like backward
compatibility like you could they could go you know they could influence influence each other
back and forth so i think that's really exciting um as a potential for us to develop um and i'm
glad that we're kind of like setting the the stage for that um okay so let so let's move on to the next topic that I have here, and that is
scalable pay scale for BPs. So do you mind talking to us about that? I know it's a little bit
big, but how could you break that down for us? Sure. So currently, if we look at the problems, so as, as we get into these next ones, let's, let me just kind of preface this by describing, you know, a problem statement is, is a good place to start. statement here is that block producers, um, maybe based on the system and how it functions today
are not super incentivized, um, in certain ways and, and their incentives maybe don't
a hundred percent align with, uh, what Telos as a network really, you know, um, needs and in a lot
of ways they do. And I don't want to discredit, you know, the block producers, you know, I run one.
Um, there's, there's plenty of, you know, people that are a hundred percent aligned
with tell us, but on paper, fundamentally, there are some things that don't align very
well.
And, uh, then the other problem is, uh, one of maybe voter apathy and on a certain level,
if you're, if you're an EVM user and you can't vote, we could call that voter apathy. And on a certain level, if you're an EVM user and you can't vote,
we could call that voter apathy. You can't vote. It's not necessarily that you don't want to,
it's just you can't and you don't want to vote. You're not interested in voting enough to go
install new wallets, get to know a new protocol, which would be Telos native, right? So, um, more voter engagement and more aligned, um, incentives with the block
producers is really where kind of all of these things we're about to talk about
are kind of born out of that's like the inspiration for these changes.
Um, so with that preface being said, scalable pay.
So for almost seven years now, since Telus launched, we've had, um,
two amounts that a, a validator, a block producer would get paid.
Um, the, the ranks one through 21, those are the active block producers. Those are the ones that
actually are signing blocks and kind of running the network. They're the active ones. And then
previously, I think it was like 52, but we've moved it down to 42 total. So today it's spots 22
through 42 would be the standbys. They're also paid.
And one of them is rotated in to be an active one
to test their readiness to produce blocks every 12 hours.
But they aren't actively producing blocks.
And they're ranked based on how many votes they have, right?
That's straightforward DPOS, um, NPOS ranked by their vote weight.
So the scalable pay, uh, and, and so the, the spots one through 21 get a certain amount.
It varies based on telling us price and over the years based on, you know, it's been said
differently, but the one thing that's consistent is that if you're in spot one through 21,
you get paid the same amount.
If you're spot 21, you get paid the same amount as spot one.
And then spots 22 through 42 get paid half of that amount.
So you have X as the amount that you get paid if you're active,
and you got half of
X if you are in the standby ranks. And what that does is it creates a level of a validator apathy.
There's a lack of incentives to do better. If you are in spot, let's say 15, you're pretty
comfortable. You're probably not going to lose enough votes to go down to 22 and have your pay cut in half so you're not going to try harder why would you try to go
from 15 to 1 except for maybe your ego um but there's there's no real motivation to contribute
more do whatever it takes to earn more votes and course, the concept is that voters vote for the validators that are contributing the most, that are representing Telos the best, offering
infrastructure, building applications. We have a number of apps now. We've kind of had an effort
for a couple of years now to get more validators who are building on Telos that are actually
developers. So if you're in those ranks, you kind of don't have any reason to try to move up to the
next spot because your pay is not going to increase. You're really cozy if you're in those, those ranks, you kind of don't have any reason to try to move up to the next spot because your pay is not going to increase. You're really cozy. If you're anywhere
in, you know, the top 10 to 15 and, uh, same goes for spots, 22 through 42. If you get into spot 42,
you're up at spot 40, 35, you know, spot 22, 21 seems really far away and you're getting paid.
So why try to, if you're not if you don't feel
you can make it into the top 21 why even try that hard um you know there's that concept so it's a
lot of game theory um but what scalable pay is is that every rank has an increase in pay so instead
of two amounts that are paid to 42 validators there are now 42 amounts that are paid to 42 validators,
there are now 42 amounts that are paid to the 42 validators.
Spot one will get more than two, two get more than three.
All the way down, we still have a threshold at 21.
So when you go from 22 to 21, there will be a big jump.
And that's just to get people, get validators more incentivized
to continue to contribute no matter what their rank is, including whoever's in first, whatever
BP is in first is incentivized to keep working hard because if they drop the second, their pay
is going to go down a bit. And, um, so that And so that's what the scalable pay scale is.
It's a goal of really further aligning the validator's interest
with the best interest of tele.
No, that's great.
I think the biggest thing that I like about this
is that it's going to create more of a competitive nature
to wanting to be number one and earning votes
so that you kind of rise up the ranks because now it gives incentive for you to rise up
the ranks.
You get paid more.
And I think there's a lot of BPs that probably have kept the network alive for a while, but
certain other ones have done more, whether it's building dApps, participating in content creation.
So I think this allows for those BPs to kind of, you know, shine above others and hopefully earn more votes so that they can get more pay for the work that they're doing.
work that they're doing. And I think that's kind of the shining aspect about all of this is that
you are going to reward those that are doing more by getting paid more. And so I think that's
exciting. I think that should really kind of drive more competition and drive the BPs to want to be
better at their positions because they could eventually just, you know, get paid less, even though they're doing the bare minimum.
And for those that are doing the bare minimum, you know,
what's stopping them from dropping even further down the ranks.
So, you know, I think, again, when you say game theory and competition,
I think that's exactly what the benefit is from all of this.
So I'm very excited about this.
I think, you know, this should start to shake things up
along with the EVM voting, you know,
now that, you know, some BPs are, you know,
they're building dApps
and people that are participating on the EVM and DeFi side,
they should be super influenced. And they have a
huge kind of duty to vote for BPs because these guys are the ones controlling the whole
structure of everything. So now with EVM voting and scalable pay, I think there's going to be a lot of changes that are going to come along and rewarding those that are working hard to do exciting things for Telos while not penalizing, but reducing pay for people that are just doing the bare minimum.
So I think that's the most exciting part that I'm getting from all of this.
the most exciting part that I'm getting from all of this. I'm excited to see it.
I'm excited to see it.
Yeah, I think that's, you have a good point and it's one that I kind of neglected to touch on is
that, as I mentioned, we've had a pretty concerted effort to get new validators registered and
that we're getting those validators are from apps that are building on telos.
We do have, like I mentioned, Kudo.
You know, we have validators from native apps and that's great, but we also have a lot of EVM apps
and we have validators that are from EVM apps, but their users are also on the EVM and can't vote for them
without, again, learning a new protocol, installing a new wallet, et cetera. And so
this is where EVM voting really also is critical is that it's only fair to the validators whose
user base is in the EVM that their users have easy access to support them.
And so now we will have that as well.
Yeah, yeah. And I think this is going to drive a lot more activity on chain as well,
because now people who hadn't been able to vote, now they get to vote.
So these are transactions at the end of the day as well.
So in a way, this does kind of impact transactions,
even if it's at a minor scale here.
But involvement and participation here
are going to drive more transactions.
So the next topic that we have here is self-staking.
What can you tell me about this?
Well, you know, it's
probably a year ago we started
kind of throwing this idea around and some
of the validators tried to speak up
against it. Some had their
own game theories about why
they didn't think it was a good idea.
But at the end of the day, it's
basically a hybrid element.
So Telos is delegated proof of stake.
You stake the Telos token.
That represents your stake.
You can delegate.
And in this case, vote is a good analogous word for delegate. You can vote with your stake
for the validators that you support.
In fact, proof of stake without delegation
kind of came first, right?
So proof of stake is when,
if you want it to be a validator on a blockchain,
you had to somehow most likely acquire on the open market,
purchasing the token of that network, and then that becomes your stake.
And the validators were ranked by how many of the tokens they held.
Very simple, and simple often is best.
simple and you know simple often is best um model that you can think about is that these validators
have aligned interest with the network they're financially invested in the network because they
bought the tokens whoever is the most financially invested of all of the validators in theory is the
most trusted if you're talking about, you know, trusting the validators
with the security of the network and the tokens on the network
and everything, those validators who are the most financially,
you know, at risk or invested in the network are the ones that,
in theory, if you, you know, there's so many other factors,
but when you're talking about blockchain, you can really only deal with things that are on chain that code can read, et cetera.
And so if you're trying to do things that are that simple, the blockchain has a ledger.
The ledger tells you what their stake is.
That's something you can use.
And it's pretty aligned with the trust that you should have in those validators, how
much stake they have. So proof of stake came, came first, right? And then, um, delegated proof
of stake was just an addition that said, well, if, if you're not a validator, but you want to
kind of delegate your stake to a validator to help that validator, uh, rise in the ranks,
because that's a validator that you trust
the most then you kind of delegate your stake which again in theory same concept a user that
maybe doesn't run a validator that has a lot of the network's tokens in theory you would trust
that user more than a user who doesn't have a lot of tokens So letting those users with more tokens have more say and more influence over
the validator ranks also makes sense. Well, Telos has delegated proof of stake, and there is no
proof of stake, except for the fact that as a validator, I can vote for myself. I keep all my
tokens in my own personal account, not in my validator account. And so, um, when I vote for myself and,
you know, 29 other block producers, cause you can vote for 30 and you, and you should, um,
that doesn't really give my validator any extra credit. The fact that I have a bunch of tokens,
um, it's purely delegation based, purely vote based. And so the self-staking is nothing more than giving validators a boost
if they have their own tokens,
meaning it's basically proof-of-stake,
adding a proof-of-stake element on top of the delegated proof
of stake so that, and this goes back to alignment of validator interests.
It goes back to, you know, having a vested interest in the network.
These validators that have a good amount of Telos tokens staked will get extra vote weight
added to their, to their vote so that they are incentivized to not only hold
tokens, but to hold tokens in their block producer so that their block producer, you know,
gets more credit. And it's, it's interesting. Many people may not realize, but we talked to
a lot of validators, you know, uh, as Telos leadership and founders, and a lot of validators you know uh as telos leadership and founders and a lot of them come
to us and just say hey how much stake do i have to buy to be a validator well we we don't have
that system they're so accustomed to you know being able to kind of invest as a validator and
buy in and and get enough to um participate in validator rewards etc just like on ethereum
participate in validator rewards, et cetera. Just like on Ethereum, 32 ETH, and you could be a
validator. Of course, they have a lot of systems over there that are built on top of that. So you
can invest fractionally and not be a validator and get the rewards. But generally speaking,
it's kind of a common expectation in validators that they can buy into the network. And then we tell them, well, no, you have to go out there and rally for yourself and
be your own cheerleader and earn the votes of the community, which is how DELUS has operated
for seven years.
And it still is a big part of it.
But for those validators that maybe are new and are willing to invest, or for those investors
that have a bunch of tokens that have considered
becoming a validator, but they know then they'd have to earn other people's votes.
Now there is actually an incentive, a reward, a benefit for having your own tokens.
And for validators that currently are running on Telos that maybe sell every month or maybe
don't sell every month.
Well, if you don't sell every month and you stake it now you're going to be rewarded for that as well because you
will be moving up in the ranks more because of your vote weight which then
ties back into the scalable pay because now there's an incentive to try to stake
that telos and hold on to it and move up one or two spots to get paid more right so it's uh
these these changes all kind of play into each other um and but that's what the uh the self
staking is it's a it's a boost that will be added um basically everything that happens today all the
math that happens today and the vote accounting that happens today will still happen and at the end of that it will it will say okay also is this particular validator staking any telos and
if they are it will get a multiplier added to it and it will be added to their their vote weight
so they they get a little bonus if they're holding on to some Telos themselves in their own custody.
Yeah, I really like how we're kind of gamifying the governance aspect of this and how, like you said, those validators that are selling their Telos versus, you know, keeping it and staking it, you know, they could get rewarded, essentially.
And the question that I have is, so if we get more participation, if we get more people
staking and voting for BPs, does that mean that that threshold essentially also gets higher? Because now, let's say you have a million telos
and you're able to kind of become a validator with a million telos, but then all these other
people are voting a little bit more than a million telos. So does that mean that that person would
essentially, like you're raising the bar for self-staking is that now it's not 1 million telos anymore, but it's 1.1 or whatever. And is that something that's going to be variable based off of
participation? No, it's, it's purely, you know, the, the, the actual math currently that was
voted in through the governance proposal is 10, a 10 X boost so if you look at um like a an example
let's say i you know my validator is um receiving let's just purely look at one voter one set of stake. My validator has a million TELO staked and it's voting for 30 other 30 validators
total. Um, because as most people that have been around tell us a while know, if you vote for less
than 30, your vote doesn't count as much. So you want to vote for 30. So if you vote for 30,
you get a hundred percent credit for your vote.
So I'm voting for my validator and 30 others.
Those 30 validators receive a credit of 1 million vote weight.
And then because my validator has staked a million telos and the multiplier is 10,
my validator will have a weight of 11 million.
Meanwhile, the other validators from my validators votes will only have 1 million.
So you get a 10 X boost for your own stake.
Um, and then of course, that's a very isolated example.
The, um, the reality is that my validator has votes from a lot of other people and those other validators have a lot of votes from other people as well
so the boost is not as extreme as I just described
but in the isolated example
it's 1 million for all 30
plus 10 million just to my own if my validator is staking for itself
got it got it okay um so you you you touched on on um you know the weight the vote um
the weight of a vote right and i think the next topic is actually vote decay so what can you tell
us about you know the newest update on that that's a good one um so vote decay is a concept that
votes are worth if you don't vote
if you don't vote often, your vote, the weight of your vote goes down.
It decays.
And that's because there are, and especially today,
there are voters who voted a year ago, two years ago, three years,
you know, potentially almost seven years ago were the first votes on Telos.
And you would think that anybody with
a significant amount of telos is paying attention so in theory maybe a lot of the older votes are
much smaller token amounts but it's not always true um and people lose keys and things happen. So,
can you hear me?
I can hear you now. Cut off for a sec.
Okay, yeah.
the,
the decay is is there to allow new votes to be worth more to encourage voter engagement and frequent voting which in theory helps keep today's best validators at the top and not
the best validators from two years ago at the top and keeps you know it it it goes for both
the voter engagement encourages the validators to be more active, more present, contribute more, socialize their contributions more, and do it often.
It keeps them active and engaged because they're trying to earn the votes of voters who are worth more today than they were six months ago.
are worth more today than they were six months ago.
So vote decay is in the, in the software, like in the code,
it's actually implemented as a inflation because of just how complex systems
like voting on a blockchain work.
It's, it's hard to go subtract some vote weight from everybody who hasn't voted in a month, for example.
It's much easier to just give new voters a boost, right? a multiplier which effectively means people who haven't voted in six months their votes are
worth less in perspective so you know if you vote that that example i gave you for the
self-staking you know i i vote with a million telos to 30 block producers they all get a credit
of a million that's still worth worth a million in five years.
But in five years, somebody else that votes with a million, that's going to be worth more than a million. Maybe it's worth 1.4, 1.5, depending on the rate of decay, which basically means that
mine is now worth less. And it encourages me to go re-vote maybe every month or so, so that my decay, uh, to, you know,
to clean the decay off my vote and, and give it the full weight. So I get the full credit.
And the theory is that when I do that, I'm not just going to click revote. I'm going to analyze
the block producers that I'm voting for. In fact, um, you know, block producers come and go. And when I go to vote and I, you know, am guilty just like anybody else, I go look at
who I'm voting for.
And sometimes, you know, on the Explorer where I vote, it shows me that I'm not voting for
30 block producers, but I know that I always pick 30 block producers.
Why is that?
Because some have unregistered.
So my vote is going towards a block producer that, that maybe, you some have unregistered. So my vote is going towards a block
producer that maybe unregistered their block producer. And so it shows they only have 29 votes
placed. So it encourages block producers to refresh their votes. And when they're doing that,
A, hopefully they revisit all 30 that they're voting for and make sure they're voting
for the best 30 that they want their votes to contribute to. But also, if they're currently
voting for a block producer that isn't active anymore, it will force them. You can't vote for
a block producer that's not registered, so it will force them to update their vote if they,
you know, were voting for somebody that's no longer registered on the network.
And we have governance, we have kicks, you know,
if block producers aren't producing blocks,
if they're not meeting the minimum requirements,
they'll get kicked off the network. And, you know, that,
that kick can be for two hours or two days or two weeks or more,
depending on the penalty and how often that block producer has been getting kicked if you get kicked
it kind of grows the kick duration so even if the block producer hasn't decided to leave
it it further discourages the things that will get a block producer kicked because now
and again it's all game theory but now if you have block producers
that are getting kicked in certain periods of time over like a one month period, they're
not registered because they got kicked because they weren't, you know, running on test net
or because they, I apologize.
Can, can, can you hear me now?
Yeah, yeah, you're back.
You were for a second.
All right, Narek, can you hear me now?
Yeah, yeah.
Sorry. You know, I don't know about anybody else, but here in the States, the spam calls are absolutely outrageous.
know, I don't know about anybody else, but here in the States, the spam calls are absolutely
outrageous and we can, we can thank the, the robo spam scam callers, um, for, for my audio
dropping like three times now. Um, they like to call around this time in the morning for me.
Um, so what I was, what I was saying is that, um, now these block producers, if they get kicked,
it's, it's more likely that voters will be refreshing their votes in theory, more voting
transactions are going to happen.
And if these voters are refreshing their votes more often to avoid decay, let's say they
revote every two weeks or every month.
And these block producers who aren't, you know, playing by the rules,
they're not running the proper infrastructure, whatever it is that caused them to get kicked.
They're unregistered for two days out of the month. Well, now they're going to be losing
votes as well, because these people are going to be voting more frequently. And when they vote,
if that block producers kick, they can't pick them, they can't vote for them if they're kicked.
So now they lost that, that, that voters vote. And the next time that voter producer's kicked, they can't pick them. They can't vote for them if they're kicked. So now they lost that voter's vote. And the next time that voter goes to vote, they probably will remember that. They would have to deliberately go back and add that validator that was kicked the last time. So, you know, it's more than just keeping voters engaged. It, again, goes back to all the other components of governance that
play well together to reduce you know reduce the things that don't help telos and and increase
alignment absolutely no this um all in all all of these updates it feels to me that it's a fresh, new kind of landscape that really allows for,
I mean, it's a refresh that we needed because now we're kind of participating,
we're incentivizing participation.
participation uh or it's it's it's the um we're rewarding people that are participating now
and or they're able to kind of have a more bigger impact on their votes and i think that's the
biggest thing here is that you know people that had voted a long time ago and didn't change their
votes and those bps were still in play, well, with these new changes, they're
going to lose their kind of their weight here.
And I think that's what's important because we don't want to be rewarding people that
were voted in a long time ago and are not doing us any favors.
And so having these systems in place is really going to allow us to have the best people,
is really going to allow us to have the best people, best BPs that are active to stay in charge here.
And I think that's the most exciting part for me is that, you know, we, this new landscape really pushes people to participate more.
more and the people, the BPs that were not really active and they were voted in from a long time
ago, well, their ranks are going to eventually fall off. They're going to have reduced pay.
You know, there's a lot of moving pieces to this that essentially, like you said, is going to
impact Telos with having BPs that are very active, that are doing things that the community wants.
And that's really the best aspect of all of these upgrades.
So I think that wraps up the call for me.
I don't know if there's any other concluding statements you'd want to give, but I think all in all, these are really significant upgrades that are going to impact the,
the Telos ecosystem in general. So thank you, Jesse. Yeah.
Yeah, no, I mean, I mean, it's in,
just to kind of wrap it all up the, the work's underway.
I think we've've i'm just uh
i think there's uh self-staking is the only thing that's not
fully implemented yet and then um what we're working on the most is the
testing at this point so everything that we talked about here, I would imagine even the
non-technical people can appreciate is a very critical section of the code. It's a critical
section of the network protocol, and it requires a whole lot of testing. It's not something that
can easily just be fixed. I mean, yes, we can easily apply fixes, but it's the kind of thing
you want to get right the first time. And there's a whole lot of things to consider when you think about, you know, does the decay apply before or after the self-staking boost?
And there's just all these, you know, nuanced things that part of the reason doing it all together makes sense is that, you know, one's going to affect the other.
is going to affect the other. So in fact, EVM voting, I started on a prototype of it
kind of months ago, and then this governance passed, we started implementing the rest of
these changes. And then we realized, oh, the EVM voting would have been missing decay.
We would have had to add the decay after the fact. So doing all these things at the same time allows us to build a whole test suite that
exercises all the potential ways the voting can be done and then make sure that the results that
we get are exactly what we should get and that way we can go into the upgrade with a lot of
confidence so yeah that's where we are right now. We've, we've got most of the implementation done focused right now, just
on, um, exhaustive testing of it all.
And once that's all done, then we'll, uh, put together an upgrade plan and,
and get it rolled out.
Um, and somewhere in there, uh, as I mentioned, we'll have to start, uh,
adding it to a UI so you can not only vote from the EVM, but, uh, some of these,
some of these numbers we talked
about, um, should also be surfaced so that when voters are making their own
decisions, they can consider the, the self stake vote weight, right?
So now that validators will be encouraged to stake their own telos that's, and it
will incentivize them like inside the consensus and you know, the actual on
chain code will incentivize them like inside the consensus and, you know, the actual on-chain code will incentivize them to self-stake.
There's no reason not to also kind of surface that in the Explorer.
When people are voting, they should know, oh, this, this validator,
maybe they want to know why they're ranked higher. Well, they,
because of the self-stake or maybe when they're trying to select the
validators they want to vote for, that's a factor that they want to consider.
So so that's, that's some of the the validators they want to vote for, that's a factor that they want to consider.
So that's some of the other work that is yet to be done,
but the community should expect is some improvements in the UI,
both so you can vote from the EVM,
as well as so you can see the new numbers reflected on the Explorer or the wallet where you're voting in the EVM
so you can see this information and use it
for whatever purpose, vote selection,
or just so you know why these VPs are ranked
the way they are.
No, this is really great.
All in all, I think this was very much needed.
And I think this is gonna start shifting things in a more positive
direction because I think what this does is really encourages participation from the
community to be more active and vote with purpose and also it encourages BPs to be more
accountable for their actions.
And this is exactly what we want to see.
So these are all welcome changes.
Thank you for your work, Jesse.
Thank you, everybody, for joining this call.
I encourage everybody to keep participating and keep tuning in to these.
But, yeah, until the next one, have a great weekend, you guys.
Thanks,
everybody. Thank you.
Have an excellent weekend.
Bye-bye.
Bye. Thank you.
