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🚨 LobbyFi 🚨 Arbitrum governance exploit & implications
Recorded: April 8, 2025 Duration: 1:33:19Space Recording
Short Summary
In a recent discussion, key figures in the DeFi space explored the implications of governance vulnerabilities and the rise of vote buying through platforms like LobbyFi. This marks a significant trend towards transparency and accountability in decentralized governance, with participants emphasizing the need for innovative solutions to enhance the resilience of governance structures.
Full Transcription
Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Hey Mel, hey Eric, good to see you guys.
Eric, I'm going to bring you up on stage really quick.
Then we'll get this thing kicked off.
Oh, Eric might be busy right now. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Eric, good to see you, man.
What's going on?
Hey, brother. Likewise. Sorry. where can I get my headphones? I might hear my cat freaking out in the background.
But yeah, excited for the content today.
Dude, I'm really excited for this today. And we actually have Lobby Fine here joining right on time.
So that's sick. Really, really like what you guys are doing, by the way.
Full support. May have called this a governance attack. It is a governance, highly profitable
trading strategy. So governance attack with no shade whatsoever. I think this is fantastic.
And this is going to push DeFi forward. It's going to, you know, I think DeFi is the kind of place that benefits from all of the stops being pulled out.
And it's the kind of system that evolves the way that nature forces survival of the fittest on different organisms.
I think, you know, DeFi is subject to natural selection in the same way.
And one of the biggest complaints I've had about crypto protocols in the last four or five years
since I've been talking about this specific attack vector is that governance,
pure governance tokens are essentially worthless. And I'll caveat that
because they're not worthless per se. They're actually very valuable to the wrong people.
And in this particular vulnerability that's opened up in Arbitrum, I think we're seeing a proof of concept. And people are not
quite realizing yet how deep the implications for this kind of vote buying, vote purchasing
are. So I'm really excited to talk about that. And I'm excited to talk about this with Eric,
because he and I worked together defending Compound. We were brought in
separately to defend Compound last July, when Humpy and the Golden Boys purchased a large
block of or accumulated a large voting block of comp tokens, and then threatened to vote
themselves the entire treasury. And people might remember this, they might know that he gave himself $25
million of comp. But what they might not know is that he also could have liquidated the entire
compound TVL to himself. There was no nothing stopping him from actually voting to take all of the funds that were in the pools and sending them to himself with a standard governance vote.
Could have pushed it right through.
And so really excited to talk with Eric about this because I know he has a lot of thoughts on the same thing.
And it looks like I'm going to have to bring him back up as a speaker.
So I've just monologued a little bit about Compound, but if you guys are interested in that, you can check out our GitHub of Economic Vulnerabilities.
We're Token Dynamics XYZ on GitHub.
And we have a list of all of these kinds of quote unquote, highly profitable trading strategies or highly profitable governance votes on GitHub with a little description of what happened, the categories and things like that.
So governance exploits are actually not new.
This is a category that has existed for quite a while.
This might even be one of the older categories of economic exploits in crypto. And to frame this a little bit for the audience, technical exploits come from a lack of bugs or technical exploits come from bugs in the code. Economic exploits come from bugs in the incentives.
the incentives. So there's a few stages broadly to protocol design. One of the stages, you know,
the first one is where you're collecting business requirements. You're getting a product spec
and saying, what is it that we want this protocol to do? And the next step is actually turning that
set of business requirements into a design. We want to say, how do we accomplish the things set out by the product spec?
And VCs typically will sign off on a product and they'll say, this is a good product. This
protocol will be useful to people. It'll have product market fit, whatever. And then it goes
to the design phase. And you sort of have a little bit of input from VCs and a little bit of input
from the devs. And, you know, the founder
is trying to come up with what is the best way to accomplish our goals in this protocol.
And, but then you translate that into a design and ship it to, you know, start writing code.
After that, you're shipping it to audit and auditors are looking for technical vulnerabilities.
And auditors are looking for technical vulnerabilities.
But in between, there's not really anyone that's looking for these kinds of vulnerabilities that come up with the system design.
And so, shameless plug, that's where we come in with at Token Dynamics.
vulnerabilities with highly profitable trading strategies, governance, exploits, vulnerabilities,
co-ops, hostile takeovers, whatever you want to call them. This thing that has just started
happening, which we are very excited about. So I'll let Eric speak to this a little bit,
introduce himself, and then we'll get this going. Hey, brother. Thanks for the intro.
Yeah, I love the light you're shedding on the space.
Like you mentioned, we've been talking about this for a long time.
A little background on me personally, background in economic philosophy.
I've been doing tokenomics and deviops for the last four or five years.
Worked in casinos a long time before then.
But yeah, Nate, this is specifically something you've
talked to me about and you opened my eyes to for quite some time, even before the Humpy attack,
and then getting the chance to work on this together. We all know that in the government
that votes are for sale with things like lobbyists, but to see it so dynamically and so
straightforward where each vote can find its exact market price.
You know,
maybe some Congress people aren't being paid enough for their vote.
And maybe some are getting paid too much.
Having a very open marketplace for the economic power of,
of governance is fascinating.
So scary and important conversation to be had.
Yeah.
Yeah.
And this is,
I'm like really excited for this because I think,
you know, I want to be really clear. I think this is a really good thing for DeFi and it's going to
cause a bit of chaos. I think a lot of protocols are going to have to reorganize their entire
architecture and their entire governance around this. But I think this is going to be one of those
things that people look back on in 2025 and say that was a pivotal moment for DeFi.
So with that, I want to go into the actual exploit, quote unquote, itself. And I hesitate
to call it an exploit or an attack. I don't like
calling highly profitable trading strategies attacks at all. I think they're vulnerabilities,
certainly, but I don't ascribe malicious intent. And certainly not to Joseph in this case. I think
Joseph was doing this because he's like, hey, someone's going to do this. Someone's going to
vote themselves with, you know, for themselves as a delegate with 20 million ARB. Might as well be me. And good for him. I'm
genuinely really excited to see, especially a good guy like Joseph, who I've been mutuals with
for a while and met in person, I think who is aligned broadly with the space doing this. So I just want to insert that caveat
there because, you know, I will be using words like exploit or attack or vulnerability. And I
want to clarify that like, this is really cool. And this is how DeFi should work. You know,
it's kind of a, this is a very code is law opportunity or a very code is law moment in DeFi right now.
So to recap really quickly what went on, we have on Token Dynamics tweet out that quote tweets Ignis, DeFi Ignis, and he says the old DAO model is in shambles.
Last weekend, Hitmonlee.eth paid 5 ETH on LobbyFi to buy almost 20 million ARB in
voting power. That's more votes than experienced DAO delegates like Wintermute or L2Beat have.
All of these votes were cast for Cup O'Joseph for Arbitrum's Oversight and Transparency Committee. And so you guys can read this full tweet. But basically,
in the analysis here that DeFi Ignace made, it looks like Joseph paid five ETH to get about
66 ETHs worth of voting power. So he stands to benefit by being paid as one of these delegates on the Transparency Committee about 66 ETH over the next year in current dollar terms.
So that is, this is the first that I'm aware of, of like a direct vote buying protocol, there might have been others.
And I feel like there may have been others in the past.
But this is the first major event that we've seen around vote buying in a large protocol.
So, Eric, any preliminary thoughts here?
Yeah, one, I agree with you.
Cup of Joseph is the right person to one exploit it but also
it's probably best for arbitram that it did go through the stuff he's building with near right
and working with liquidy uh he's a very prolific and um good natured builder in the space like the
kind of guy we need more of um but uh uh but but yeah it's uh it's scary that such acute measures can be taken.
It's an entire new field where you kind of like how we have before, like liquidity.
Now where liquidity is existing in multiple places at once, we need to have like kind of governance aggregation pools and like specific like lending markets for voting power.
All the kinds of things it sets up are scary.
All the kinds of things it sets up are scary.
And any means of attempting to nullify the governance power of tokens directly,
by definition, removes the utility from the token and then further cedes to lower valuation.
So, I mean, governance isn't solved in the U.S. or in the world in general.
Everyone's taking a stab at it.
I don't know.
I kind of side with Holstoy on the whole governance thing.
It's only going to work if it's a unanimously elected king
that is of a different type than the electors.
Wow. Hot take. Monarchist Eric.
So there's a couple things you said there that I really want to get into.
One is the nature of the value accrual to tokens based on governance rights. And also you mentioned something interesting. I want to ask, do you think we're going to see some people hard coding Lobbify out? And if so, how do you see all that playing out? Like as a preliminary defense, this would be like the centralized way to defend against vote buying.
Sorry, can I read the last part again?
I got called real quick.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
I was curious if you think that we're going to see people hard coding Lobbify out of their voting.
Like, is that like that preliminary?
Like if a wallet interacts with it, the wallet itself is like geofence.
And then you get like the whole like tornado cash fallout where it's like, hey, we're going to block governance participation from all the wallets have interacted with this one.
And they have to start sending like dust to a bunch of different wallets to nullify their governance power that would be hilarious oh dude i wasn't even thinking
about that i was thinking more they're just gonna like blacklist the smart contract address which
would be stupid because they could just re like redo another smart contract address and then
it does like it doesn't actually solve the problem but i But I think people might try this in the chaos that's coming over the next couple weeks, months, as Lobbify lists more things.
And I love we have Lobbify actually in the lobby.
So this is really cool.
This is an awesome opportunity to get to chat about all this stuff.
This is an awesome opportunity to get to chat about all this stuff.
So one of the reasons I'm so excited about this as well is because I've got an entire list of protocols whose treasuries are roughly their governance token cost.
And, you know, as you might suspect at Token Dynamics, we're actively tracking these kinds of things.
So one of the really interesting things that you sort of hit on, Eric, there is the nature of the value accrual to governance tokens.
I've said previously and in past tweets for the last several years that governance tokens are only valuable for the wrong reasons.
They're only valuable to people who would vote themselves the treasury or would, for
a competitor, let's say, who would point Uniswap's front end to the SushiSwap website
or something like that.
This actually lowers the cost of attack, like orders of magnitude
for these protocols. And so what I think we're going to start to see is people buying votes
with tokens that are really, really underpriced or relative to the potential gains that they could
get. And it's not because the tokens themselves are underpriced.
It's that the votes are a fraction of the token cost. I see Lobbify has a thumbs down in here,
which is interesting. I wonder how you guys are seeing it. I want to bring you up in a couple of
minutes, but I want to be able to hit on a couple of these points as we fill the space up
here, as we fill the room. But Eric, how do you see all of that playing out?
Yeah. So this is kind of like our thoughts on restaking as an ecosystem. It's like the value
isn't in, like the economic security that's provided isn't in the technology of making it possible.
It's in the amount of value that can be slashed.
It's not that like, oh, slashing is like part of a feature or a bug and how it works.
It's like slashing is the entire product.
The entire product of a governance token is how it can be attacked, is the treasury that can be exploited.
can be attacked is the treasury that can be exploited. Um, and making the difficulty
of exploiting it high, like the cost of exploiting it higher than, um, than the value that can
be taken from it as most, like the only value they've had is the liquidity against their
token. So it's my, they might say, Oh, hundreds of millions of dollars worth of token, but
it's like, you know, you can sell for a couple million of liquidity if that.
And so that's the only real value behind that.
It gets back into the what's the true value of treasury conversation.
But with that being the primary attack factor, discrediting the allowance to get there,
as you talk about orders of magnitude to cheapen this attack,
can make these treasuries actually accessible.
If anything, to me, it makes the tokens more actually valuable
while theoretically lowering the price significantly
because of the bloat and the bubble that's existed there.
So I think that's a very unorthodox take, and I completely agree.
take and I completely agree. Like that's, uh, that is that spot on, like the value of it's like
Like, that's spot on.
a thing. The purpose of a thing of a system is what it does. Like the value of a token is what
it gets you. And that's why governance tokens aren't at $0 right now. Like that's why Uniswap
is not at zero. That's why all of, well, Uniswap might be that people are holding out for the fee switch
and they're still meme sniped by this retarded idea.
But in most cases, tokens will trend to their fundamental value, absence speculation.
And in all cases, they will trend to their fundamental value absence speculation. And so what we've seen is a lot of
old school DeFi governance tokens trending to low values. I'll throw one out there. Hedgic
is an OG options protocol whose treasury is about, I think it's one third or something. It's a, it's a very, uh, it's a significant,
but small amount of the token price. Um, and, uh, you know, compared to other tokens,
like you could imagine a token that's speculatively valued, that's, uh, 20 X the treasury.
And, um, and that's because, you know, there's, there's future cash flows and all of these kinds of things that are built in that are maybe fundamentally valuable or fundamental expectations.
And then there's also speculation. tokens that can push votes through with on-chain governance. These are basically ripe for the
picking through vote delegation and buying votes. So I think these are the kinds of things that
we're going to start to see over the next month, two months. And there have even been some protocols that are sort of working around this,
they're not working on exactly, you know, takeovers with, you know, novel mechanics,
but doing things through like a semi centralized legal route, salutary, build for weight, is Dimitri back the bunnies protocol.
And he's basically looking to accumulate governance power and do this kind of thing.
So there are a lot of protocols right now that are vulnerable in this way.
I think those are all opened up by Lobbify.
I see Eric dropped.
He may have had to jump on a call.
Busy man.
If anyone else would like to come up and speak, very happy to have you here.
Lobbify in particular.
If you guys want to come up or if someone else comes up, I'm happy to discuss this with you all. But yeah,
I wanted to frame a little bit more around economic security vulnerabilities and governance
attacks in particular. So as mentioned, we have a running list of all of the governance exploits that have happened in crypto for
the last 10 years since we've started to have governance.
And we have a few, you know, I have a few personal favorites.
Like I mentioned, Eric and I, Eric, who was just speaking, got brought in to ThreatModel
on Compound, we ended up recommending a different version of Comp
that was not tradable that could delegate votes. And we outlined the potential vulnerabilities,
the game theory on it, and the rationale for our recommendations. Eric had another recommendation
to Compound. And as far as I'm aware, they haven't
implemented it yet. But this was all to mitigate the damage threatened or done by Humpy and the
Golden Boys. This is a group of sort of like M&A kind of, it's like a mergers and acquisitions
group that operates in DeFi. It's a bunch of whales who accumulate governance power and then are able to liquidate treasuries or turn protocols in their favor in some other way.
So Compound is the most recent largest governance attack.
There have been other governance exploits.
NIFTEX was an NFT fractionalization platform. There was an opportunity to
use governance to gain an advantage on the platform. There have been a couple indexed
finance was an inactive DAO that still had treasury assets. And this attack was prevented by a very close vote at the last
moment, but an example of the kind of governance, quote unquote, attacks that can happen,
similar to the one that we're seeing with Arbitrum. And for those of you just joining, we've got a summary of the ongoing drama at Arbitrum and in Token Dynamics profile.
Go check it out. It's by DeFi Ignace, who writes great threads. You should follow him as well.
But basically, someone voted for themselves as an Arbitrum delegate. They paid five ETH on LobbyFi to get the voting power to earn,
ultimately, 66 ETH's worth of rewards from the Arbitrum Dow over the next year.
Great move, highly profitable governance vote, and we're all for it. And we're really excited to discuss some of the novel implications of this kind of thing.
I see a couple people in the audience.
Village Farmer, if you want to come up here and chat about governance exploits, about this in particular.
I know we've talked a little bit about economic security.
Lobbyify, feel free to request.
I'll be watching for that from you guys.
But while I wait, just go through some of the other governance exploits.
My personal favorite was Build Finance.
I cite this a lot as one of the canonical or archetypal governance exploits.
or archetypal governance exploits.
So BUILD is my favorite because the DAO was basically,
someone bought a bunch of BUILD tokens
that were very relatively underpriced
and they managed to push through a vote
that liquidated the whole treasury to themselves.
And the sad sort of,
I don't know, the sad irony is that Build Finance community was actually aware of it as it was
happening. So the attacker created a proposal to claim the treasury for themselves. And there were
repeated attempts to rally the community. But there wasn't enough voter turnout to actually turn the proposal down.
So this resulted in a total collapse of the Build Finance Protocol, Build Finance Dow,
and the attacker got about 450k in profit. So these are like highly, quote unquote,
highly profitable trading strategies. This term comes from A.V. Eisenberg, who is kind of, he's like the George Soros of crypto, in that he's a terrible
person, but he's a really good systems thinker. And he's able to exploit protocols by leveraging
the mechanics that the protocols themselves set. So that's another characteristic of economic security is these are situations, the vulnerabilities,
economic vulnerabilities are where the code is followed perfectly.
The code is perfect.
There's nothing wrong.
There's no reentrancy attack.
It's not like a technical exploit, a technical vulnerability.
It's people identifying mistaken system mechanics and then taking advantage of them.
And so that's what happened in the case of Build Finance.
And that's what's being enabled on a larger scale by Lobbify.
And so Eric and I were talking while he was on briefly about the nature
of value accrual to a token. Eric thinks this is going to reprice tokens upward. I think it's going
to be kind of binary distribution on that. I tend to think that it's going to reprice things
down in some cases, of course, in the cases that for the protocols that get completely exploited or their treasuries liquidated.
But some may have upward price trajectories.
These are things that we're still modeling and thinking through in-house.
But I see a couple of people in the audience asking to speak,
including Lobbify. So I'm very curious if they have any thoughts on this. And we also have Solar
Curve coming up, who I'm not sure might be at Lobbify, but I'm going to approve Lobbify. You
guys can chime in. And then Solar after that, we can chat a bit.
But I've just accepted you guys as speakers up here.
So feel free to jump in, Lobbify, on any of the topics we've talked about so far.
Yeah, Nate. Hi.
Danny from Lobbify speaking.
Thanks for the intro.
I have been in this space, I think, from the very beginning.
You've seen a couple thumbs down from my side. I just wanted to clarify on that.
Before I do so, may I ask you just one question?
Could you once again outline how this proposal in particular has been exploited
or how Lobbify has enabled an exploit in this particular case?
Sure.
Yeah, so I mentioned I've called this an exploit.
I think it's, you know, you could call it an exploit.
You could call it a highly profitable vote.
But that's, I think, the nature of economic
quote-unquote exploits is they're all questionably exploits. Like it's not, in my opinion,
they're not exploits. You're using the system to do what it was designed to do. But I think people
are going to describe this as an exploit. And that's why we like to categorize them as vulnerabilities, because Arbistram certainly has a vulnerability to people who can now buy votes and vote their own interest.
entirely because they designed DAO governance the way that everyone has been designing DAO governance.
And the thing that I love about it is the vulnerabilities are finally being laid bare, enabled by vote purchasing, which was completely inevitable.
And so I'm really excited to see your protocol and what you're doing to facilitate the, you know, maybe the implosion of DAO governance, but probably the re-architecture of DAO governance.
And we've built several protocols with novel governance with this particular threat in mind.
And yeah, I'm just excited to see people finally waking up to this thing I've
been saying for five years. So it might be an exploit. You could call it something else.
I might ask, like, what would you call it?
I wouldn't call this an exploit in any case. If you've read through the post from Ignis
and if you've looked into the proposal, I believe your colleague
that dropped out a bit earlier
thought that
Karl of Joseph actually got the seat. He did not get the seat.
So it was not a profitable strategy for Karl of Joseph at the end of the day.
Since 20 million
voting power we have is not enough
neither to exploit nor to move a vote if nobody else votes for a candidate.
So I just want to make sure this is clear for everyone here.
A couple of Joseph didn't end up getting anything from this, but he or Hitmanly, whoever, ended up just
paying the price and getting nothing. That's for starters. In terms of the
exploit, I just don't, you know, last couple days and weeks and actually months
since we got the delegated voting power, we've been chasing people calling Lobbify a bribing mechanism
and chasing people calling out for, you know, describing Lobbify as this tool for governance
attacks. I know not everybody looks deep enough into docs, not everybody checks all our tweets,
but I'll give a really quick TLDR over here.
Lobbify will never, and once again never, allow any kind of governance attacks through Lobbify.
The beauty and the curse of our architecture
is that we have to add proposals manually.
And we decided to do this way for different reasons,
the main one being security,
and the other one being,
well, we want to set the price accordingly to each proposal.
We don't want to set one price for all proposals.
So, as I just described, it's not possible to start any kind of governance attack through
Lobbify, since we're not interested in enabling anything like that.
It's not in our interest in any way.
We are Arbitum token holders, unfortunately,
or fortunately, so that any kind of governance attack would actually hit us personally. And
we're building Lobbify in a way so that we can be aligned with Arbitrum, which I know,
again, is not really evident from the outside but
we've been given our best to communicate that to the outside recently. So that's
my five cents on the governance exploit and attacks point. I just don't
think it's rightful to describe it this way. I think it's a bit of a clickbait in this case.
But it is up to you how to name this, but I hope it's clear to anyone listening to this one, that Lobbify is not doing exactly what you are describing what it's doing.
Cool, I appreciate that clarification and can definitely sympathize with your position there.
that clarification and can definitely sympathize with your position there. I'm curious how you
decided to enable this particular vote and what makes this one not a, you know, what,
where is the line for what proposals you add?
you add?
We will host
a space on Thursday
where we'll go into more
detail on this one, but
the short answer
will be, it is
us who decides what
proposals will be
made available on Lobbify, and which
not.
That's the first point. And the second point, we
always write a rationale on the Arbitrum Forum in terms of if or not we are making the voting
bar available for any proposal and to what price we set. So we got different models with the instant buy auction. So we need to pick
a price for the instant buy. We may or may not make the auction not available, which
has got an effect on how we vote if the voting power does not get sold. And that's all is
landing on the forum before we make the voting power available. And we always allow a couple of hours before we make it available.
So that could be some public discourse.
Now, we didn't have it yet.
I believe there was just one time somebody texted us on Telegram privately
that they were concerned about the price.
But until today, nobody ever reacted to this.
And I believe the latest reaction on the forum and in Twitter
has been that, okay, probably the next time
we will be reacting to those rationales
Lobbify is writing because we are listening
and we will hold ourselves back
from making voting power available for a proposal
if there are concerns out there until we are clear with the community
and with the DAO that it is secure for this vote to go out at that particular price.
So that's really interesting.
So you guys are kind of, it sounds like you're using the social consensus to determine which votes should be for sale.
Yeah, that would be the best description. Obviously, we didn't have that much discourse up until now.
So it's mostly been us who's been deciding and looking at proposals.
So it's mostly been us who's been deciding and looking at proposals.
And to give an example, we are not making our voting power available
for the Security Council election in Arbitrum,
which is probably the most important proposal in Arbitrum during this year,
especially because of the security concerns.
We don't want to enable that kind of attack factor
because the one thing is the upco
election. And this is, again, this is only our opinion. Some people out there and apparently
the foundation has got a different opinion on us. But with the oversight committee, it's an
absolutely different story than with the Security Council, which basically having a seat in the security console
would bring one
nearer to a real governance attack, so
we decided to refrain from doing it
on that case. But yeah, in
future, it's got to be
a social consensus within
Arbitrum Doe.
That makes sense, and
I can see why you would make that choice.
The distinction to me is not completely clear
in the terms of like having clear criteria
for what is and what is not an exploit.
And I'm kind of leading here
because this is like the nature
of all economic vulnerabilities
and the nature of like
code is law philosophy and these kinds of things. It's like there is not a clear definition of
intent from a protocol design perspective where in like going into the code is law idea,
in law you have the law, you have the interpretation of the law,
and you have the enforcement of the law. But in smart contracts, so with traditional contracts,
you have each of these three elements. You have the legislative branch of whatever government,
you have the interpretation through a court system, through a judicial system with judges
or juries, and then you have enforcement through police and violence
is the ultimate enforcement mechanism. The thing that I appreciate and resonate with
so much about crypto is that we don't rely on violence as a mechanism of enforcement,
but instead we rely on economic incentives, the financial incentives that are designed into the protocol to make
it work the way it does.
But the thing that we maybe quote unquote sacrifice is the ability to infer intent into
on-chain actions.
This is one of the problems with intent protocols being generalizable to anything more than
purchase orders. And even as we saw
with the cow swap vulnerability last week, intent protocols are not perfect either, even for
price matching solutions. But so what I'm getting at here is like, I'm not seeing a clear
delineation between like this thing is a potential security risk and this thing is just a great way
for someone to accumulate voting power and influence for themselves to benefit themselves.
In this case, I would say probably not at the expense of the protocol, but certainly to accumulate
more influence in a sort of like an arbitrage transaction.
And I also appreciate that you clarified that Joseph didn't get the seat.
I saw that in, I think, a follow-up thread to Ignis.
But that kind of behavior, it feels like the genie is kind of out of the bottle.
And I am curious whether you see
other protocols spawning joseph is here i would love to get you up on stage man this is really
cool i'm so excited to have this space going um so i feel like the genie's out of the bottle a
little bit joseph actually said the old gods are dead i I love it. Like, that's sick. This is the direction
that I think DeFi needs to go. Dow governance, if it's ever going to work, has to reckon with
the potential for people to purchase votes. And in this case, I think it's a really great thing.
I think this was awesome. And I've said already, Joseph is coming in here now. I'm going to pull
him up on stage. But I've already said, I think this couldn't have happened with a better person because Joseph is aligned with the interests
of the DAO. But I'm curious from LobbyFive's perspective and from Joseph's perspective,
if you think this is going to spawn more protocols like it. So I'll pull up Joseph right now
like it. So I'll pull up Joseph right now to speak and, um, and we can keep talking about this.
In the meantime, Lobby Phi, do you want to respond to that at all? So my response would be fairly
simple. I hope so. Um, this is the term we came up with, I think almost one year ago. We call it governfy and Joseph also reused this term
and I think this term is also in good hands if Joseph is using this one. We hope that governance
will become more sexy, we hope that governance will become the new big thing or you know,
a new big thing again as it has been before. We just think it's not fair where governance is right now,
which state, what the opinions are on governance as a topic,
as a place to work in.
And we would like to see a change.
So we would love to see more projects coming up.
Obviously, not every project is going to be willing to work with the DAOs.
Some of them will be willing to exploit other DAOs.
This is why, I guess, token holders are better off using Robbify, not other projects at the end of the day.
But that's left to the token holders, I guess.
And I'll leave it to Gav for Joseph here.
Joseph, go for it.
Question, Nate?
I guess to respond to Lobbify
and maybe spur our discussion onward,
I'll give you a recap as well.
But, you know, the thing that comes to mind for me with competitor protocols, I also really hope that they spawn.
And I'm curious whether people are going to jump for the higher APY with competitor protocols where they can delegate their votes to many, many more things,
they can delegate their votes to many, many more things, even potentially at the expense
of the token price if a highly profitable governance vote went through and liquidated
the treasury or something like that, you know, an extreme case. But Joseph, I know you have
some thoughts on this i've seen you tweeting about it the last couple days this is sick
some thoughts on this. I've seen you tweeting about it the last couple of days. This is sick.
uh well i mean i've been tweeting about this for five years actually so you know vitalik wrote the
article on putarchy i think in 2015 or something so all of this stuff like people have thought of
this thousands of years ago like you know, Plato and Socrates wrote about democracy and
bribery and, you know, philosophy behind that. I think the particular implementation of Lobbify
makes it more transparent. And eventually, you know, every fortune 500 company, every publicly traded company, every Dow is all going to have these very transparent, hopefully, models of lobbying and delegating corporate governance power. and that can be used for good or it can be used for evil and it can be used to turn oil companies into solar power companies
and it can be used to hand power over to the workers
or it can be used for things that are bad.
So I think it's worth pursuing,
especially if you have very aligned, positive people
like the LobbyFi team running it.
They've made a number of safeguards where they agree not to participate in every vote.
So it's not an automatic, they vote for whatever the highest bidder is.
They are deciding first, should we even participate?
And I think that is pretty like altruistic thing because they didn't have to do that.
Lobbify is
awesome. I think it definitely
100x's from here.
Just
bullish on Governify as a segment.
That's
probably the answer to the
first question.
I could talk about this stuff forever.
It's super exciting to me as a governance nerd and longtime DAO contributor.
Yeah, I love if you did.
I mean, I'm excited.
It's 3 a.m. where I am.
And I was like, you know what?
I'm going to put on a Twitter space on this right now.
This is the coolest thing that I've seen happen in the last
several weeks. And there have been a lot of cool things that have happened in the last several
weeks. But I love what you said about this has been theorized and discussed for a long time.
You and I both have been talking about this for a while. You've been talking about it for five
years, the potential for bribery and vote buying. And Vitalik was talking about futarchy, which I'm sure we'll get into,
because this is like a sort of a proof of concept of that
and seeing what that might look like in practice and how we evolved toward it.
Yeah, I don't, the one thing I don't, I don't like calling,
I don't think it's an exploit.
So it's not a very nice title.
I mean, I wouldn't call it an exploit either, but I think mean I wouldn't call it an exploit either
but I think everyone's going to call it an exploit
it's in the same category as like highly profitable trading strategy
and I would say like code is law
and if you design something bad and someone takes advantage of it
that's not really
it shouldn't have negative connotations
you don't want to spread panic.
You don't want people to think that Arbitrum DAO has been captured in some way,
which it hasn't,
or that money is being drained unfairly from the treasury,
which it's not.
So it's not like,
I don't like,
exploit in this space means a very specific thing.
And that's like clearly not what's happening here.
This is an experiment.
And I mean,
the implications are really interesting,
but yeah,
it's just not accurate in my opinion.
That's fair.
What would you call it?
Arbitrum governance,
the future of arbitrum governance,
the future of all DArum governance, the future of Arbitrum governance, the future of all DAO governance,
lobbying, transparent lobbying.
I think GovernFi as a segment, there's GameFi, there's SocialFi, GovernFi is going to be a thing.
We've just finally reached the point in the past 10 days where governance tokens are not down only and people actually want to use the governance power.
You know, like UniToken has no value because there's no fee switch.
You know, there's no fees going to UniHolders.
You're just betting on the Uniswap ecosystem.
But nobody actually cares enough to buy Uniswap token to participate in governance because the governance is useless.
Arbitrum has finally reached the point where the first DAO ever, it's so DAO-y and there's actual
real capital and actual value on the table. So we've finally reached the point where it's actually valuable
to buy governance power.
That has never been true for any DAO before.
Sad as it is to say.
That's not an exploit.
That's like ARB token becoming valuable.
That's very bullish for Arbitrum DAO,
in my opinion.
It's some sort of ARB.
It's some sort of AR arb. Yeah, yeah. It's some sort of arb. Yeah, yeah.
Yeah. No, agreed. I think categorizing these things as exploits is probably not the, that
has the wrong connotations. But I think you were answering what to call the space fair, right? But I am wondering
what to call these going forward. And so I had mentioned previously that I like to call these
vulnerabilities. We put them in our GitHub repo as vulnerabilities.
No, it's not a vulnerability. It's designed this way. ARB token is publicly traded on DEXs.
And to say that this is something new, that, oh, you're buying votes for the first time, this is not how we planned it.
No, as soon as the second the ARB token was created, there were hundreds of millions of dollars put into liquidity pools and set up with market makers on exchanges, etc.
So you've always been able to buy vote power.
Lobby Fi has made it more transparent and more efficient.
That's it.
It's not an exploit at all,
or not a unintended something at all, in my opinion.
No, I think it is intended.
I actually, I think we agree,
but I'm seeing this as like,
there is maybe not with lobby fight if they curate perfectly, but, um, I would say, you know,
I did ask them like, by what metric are you excluding or including certain governance proposals
for vote purchases? But, um, I think my point is the same as yours is like,
this was actually intended in the protocol design, but it can lead to these misalignments
of incentives. And, you know, imagine a scenario where LobbyFi said they specifically excluded this and they were thinking they were very forward thinking and not allowing votes for the Arbitrum Security Council, because that would be like a critical vulnerability to have, right?
If someone could just vote themselves onto the Security Council or vote themselves as, you know, N of M.
Here's the problem with that, Nate. People can already do
that. You can go borrow 33 million ARB from Aave right now, and you can go vote yourself onto the
security council. That's enough for you to get on, actually. So you can already do that from the
market. And the issue we have right now is that the unalignment is not from Lobbify.
It's from everything else.
You have to choose.
If you are an ARB holder, you have to choose whether you want your ARB tokens to be used in the economic network, Arbitrum network, that gives it value.
And put them into DeFi, borrow against them, lend them out, use the economic value that makes them valuable,
or leave them in your wallet, don't touch them, and delegate it out. Because you can only delegate
if your token is not earning anything, if it's not deposited in any program.
So the misalignment comes from the existing design of all DeFi governance tokens.
And the true alignment is you can delegate and you can earn a part of the value that you are creating by participating in governance and keeping your vote power.
And so the alignment for ARB token holders is actually coming from Lobbify and everything else is what's broken.
But that's scary. That's a change to the existing
power structures. And so
someone might try to frame that as
misalignment.
But actually, it's just because they're
afraid of giving up power
and moving
things from actual
insider games to
an actual free market for governance power that is more
transparent than what happens now. I appreciate that. That's my monologue.
No, it's good, dude. I mean, I'm so glad that you came on so we could talk about it.
I would say I think the truth is maybe somewhere in the middle.
Like I would, I would say there's definitely a lot of potential for exploits from this
kind of system.
And as competitors spawn, there will be things that most people will call exploits.
But the, the nature of economic vulnerabilities is that they're ambiguous as to whether they
were intended consequences of the protocol design or not. And what I think you're queuing into is
that thing that you've been talking about for the last several years, which is governance
is for sale. The existing system allows people to buy votes. It's just not transparent.
Lobbify is democratizing access to the thing that already goes on behind closed doors and making it
public. And I think people are going to react to this as a new exploit vector. They're going to say,
to this as a new exploit vector. They're going to say, this is bad. They're ruining Dow governance
or something like that. I mean, I'm, I'm trying to come up with like, uh, the average person's
interpretation here. Um, from my perspective, yeah, Dow governance was fucked. It was always
fucked. Token votes is fucked. Like token, one token, one vote is a stupid system uh you know people have
been critical i don't i don't agree with that i think it's a great idea interesting all right
well uh maybe we'll dive into that i i think uh yeah let's let's jump into it one one token, one vote, man.
And so how do you see...
Let me give you a history lesson really quick. Okay. For thousands of years, the working class of the world have organized themselves into guilds
and into cooperatives and worker co-ops and that has been one of the primary
means and unions that has been one of the primary means to compete with uh more powerful capital
interests right the the peasants are able to create a middle class during feudalism outside
of the the power of the feudal lords who have all the capital only because they're able to build guilds of high skilled workers.
And the same is true today when you have workers being exploited by huge rich corporations.
They're only really able to work together and overcome those by and get more rights and get more money and get more of the economic power
behind their labor through organizing and through creating unions. Right. And
there are lots of co-ops. I've worked for farming co-ops before. You know, I love REI.
You know, you have these co-ops. It's very hard for a co-op to compete with a corporation that does the same thing because the corporation can issue debt.
Corporation can borrow against their shares. The corporation can just access capital a lot cheaper and a lot more efficiently.
And that helps them grow and outcompete cooperatives. Right. And outcompete unions. And when you have a way to completely decentralize, autonomously agree
to rules and do very, very effective fundraising, do very, very effective capital management
in a way that anyone can participate and anyone in the world can join, you can create this
type of guild and cooperative model that
can compete with larger capital interests because crowdfunding is so much more efficient.
So the one vote, one share, you know, lets us organize ourselves as a DAO, but also raise
funding and also play these capital games that we couldn't do before.
That's why DAOs are worth pursuing.
That's why DAOs are better than co-ops, but also better than companies.
And maybe this vision has not been fully fulfilled by DAOs, but DAOs have only existed for seven
years.
So we're going to get there.
And I think Lobbify is, you know,
one of the main steps along, along that path. Sorry if that was a little bit rambly, but
now it's okay. I really, I really do think it matters a lot.
Yeah, I do too. I think this is a really important moment and an important protocol
design opportunity or, you know, a protocol emergence.
Like you mentioned futarchy, and I want to get there so we can talk about how this is sort of a
proof of concept for futarchy. But, you know, you mentioned like history, looking back at history,
I think there's been a lot written about democracy. I think there are reasons that the philosophers in Greece and Rome talked about democracies versus republics. And there's a reason that the United States evolved toward a republican form of government rather than a pure democracy.
form of government rather than a pure democracy. One of my favorite quotes about democracy is
Thomas Jefferson, who said it's mob rule where 51% of the people vote away the rights of the other
49. And in corporate law- What if the other 49 could pool their resources and buy a couple more
votes to protect themselves? That would be great, but then they would become the 51% and they could do the same thing. And so going back to the idea
of exploit versus vulnerability, the vulnerability still exists. Whether you call it an exploit or
not is subjective, and that's the nature of economic vulnerabilities. But in corporate law,
this is prevented by a principle called fiduciary duty, where the minority shareholders are protected. Even if 51% of people control the vote, majority can't just act for their own benefit. So they couldn't just liquidate the entire company to themselves. We don't have that in DeFi. And for that reason...
First off, that example that you just gave, I have literally seen that happen in corporate finance in 2024.
I'm sure it does. And it's supposed to be protected by legal structures and the judicial system already does what we're seeing Lobbify enabling
transparently and publicly. But I'm just pointing out that this is a type of vulnerability for
protocols that design in this way. And so I think the solution is going to be something that
modifies one token, one vote, or changes the principle of token holder voting.
So in terms of you say solution, you know, solution to what exactly?
Solution to being 51% attack, you know, that any type of system that uses voting is always
going to be vulnerable to a majority.
Yes.
That's what you mean yeah i i do and so 51 percent
attacks are they so the only the only way out is the hope for a benevolent dictator
it's funny eric before you came on eric who i uh eric and i got brought in separately to
defend compound when they got attacked by humpy and the Golden Boys last year,
or maybe it's not an attack.
Maybe it's just a highly profitable vote.
We got brought in, and Eric said his full disclosure,
his background in political and economic philosophy
has led him to monarchism.
So he said it in not so many words but uh that is one i hate him
solution right you would like him he's a good guy i i i honestly i was at the jefferson last weekend
because it's cherry blossom season in dc right now and i read these you know these quotes about
democracy from jefferson who by the way was a slave owner. And it really
makes me think that the end game has to be democracy and a democracy where everyone is
so tied together that what's good for me is good for everyone else. And everything we do should be working towards that.
Like, I'm working towards monarchy.
Like, what the hell?
It's such a waste of time.
We already did that.
It doesn't work.
We did that for a thousand years.
Life sucked for 99% of people.
Like, you don't want to be working towards monarchy.
That's not it.
I think Lobbify is away from that. The second largest delegate
on Arbitrum, most of these delegates that are there have all their ARB from Vesting because
they worked for off-chain labs or they got it on Airirdrop day and have never gotten any more.
So if you are a new person, you have a new idea that you want to bring to a DAO
and you're a good actor, it's really, really hard to get delegation and get vote power.
It's really hard. That's why Compound got attacked because the OGs made their money and left and they're not paying attention anymore.
And the treasury was being captured. And some other people said, I don't want the treasury to be captured by you.
If the treasury is going to be captured, it might as well be by me.
by me, you know?
system where you have a couple people
who you trust,
they get bored
after three years, you know?
So, I've never
seen that work. I think the
goal in any
solution that we talk about should be resilience.
And I have posted many, many ideas on Arbitrum,
on the forums that have been some fully rejected
by the large delegates because it threatens
their power or they just don't like me because they're upset about
random things. But it's all about
resilience. So I think if you show up to a DAO and you contribute
and you're doing really good work, the DAO should give you some boat power. And if you prove
yourself benevolent, you should be rewarded for that instead of being early. Just because you're early does not make you benevolent. And the mitigation,
if you are designing a DAO where you don't want Lobbify to have power, then you need to provide
people an economic benefit to not delegate to Lobbify. There's no yield for ARB holders.
I am trying to get ARB to be a staking token where you can stake and participate in governance and earn yield for being a good boy and you get lots of attendees.
And the longer that gets slowed down, the more incentive there is to delegate to Lobbify and sell your vote.
So if the delegates and the people who are complaining about Lobbify now are serious, they'll take any one of my suggestions.
I've never seen any of them make any suggestions about how to actually mitigate besides just kind of complaining and saying, oh, we should ban something that we don't have the technical capabilities to actually ban.
You know, there's lots of things we can do here.
Like I said, rewarding people who are benevolent
and just designing it better.
But that takes work.
The other one in a proposal that I'm working on right now
is upgrade ARB token.
And I think that this will be really easy to build with Aragon's new modular governance stuff,
is make delegation have a curve where it goes down over time.
And so you should have a decay factor on delegation because you need to have turnover.
And in America, we have congressmen for two years
if your congressman fucks up you get rid of them in two years if an arbitram delegate is one of
the most powerful people and they totally fuck up or somebody has tried to take over compound
dow and that was really bad they're still the most powerful person in compound doubt, by the way. So there's no turnover.
There's no, like the very, very most basic things about like making democracy safer that we
literally figured out in ancient Greece 3000 years ago. We haven't even implemented in our 2020,
whatever, you know, modern smart contracts where we think we're so
smart. We haven't even planned for that. So there has to be more turnover. That is a really
important safety mechanism. And if you don't want Wobbify to take over your DAO, then you should
implement those things. But no work has been done on that so far. And all the big delegates are
going to vote against it, I guarantee you, because it threatens their power. So we'll see. That's
kind of my take. That's a sick take. I agree with almost everything you said. I think,
especially with it being blocked by these people whose interests are entrenched with the existing system.
I think it's important to highlight that DAO governance is already captured by people who are not subject to the kind of checks and balances that we would want to see in an ideal protocol.
protocol. And yeah, I'd love to see. We designed a similar mechanism and recommended it to compound
for their stakes token. There's a whole discussion board on CompXYZ on that. But I'd love to see
DAOs implementing these kinds of novel governance structures or not even novel, but just new to DeFi to prevent the kind of vote purchasing,
bribing behavior that's possible and going on behind the scenes already, but now just going
to proliferate because of protocols that enable it. I think also Lobbify, you guys should add
Joseph's proposal to the thing and then Joseph, you should vote for it.
You guys can get this going.
Honestly, I have been bullied so much in the last week.
So I was not the one who bought the Lobbyfy votes for myself in the last election. And I do not intend to spend money on future ones because
I'm just being bullied a lot. And it's not very fun. I also am not here to antagonize people.
I'm here to push the limits and make Arbitrum Dow more resilient. I think I was very,
and make Arbitrum DAO more resilient.
I think I was very, very qualified for the position I was running for.
And I don't really plan to use Wifi unless there's something really, really close, I guess.
I shouldn't write it off.
But I hope other people will use it to vote for me or for my proposals.
But I'm not going gonna do that for now
yeah no i appreciate that disclaimer too i i'd assumed that it probably was you behind hit
only.eth um but uh i also for what it's worth i assume that you were just gonna get
yeah i assume that you were just gonna get the delegation because I know you and I figured you would just be
a good Arbitrum delegate, so I'm like,
oh yeah, everybody's going to vote for Joseph.
This is cool that he's going to be an Arbitrum delegate.
Sorry I didn't go
through, but
I think I would have won if I had not
disclosed that Hitmonlee told me
he voted for me with the Lobby 5 votes.
Dang.
Because as soon as that happened,
I know at least two people that were told they had to change their vote.
And there was, you know, people working against me
or just to make sure that I didn't win.
But, you know, it's fine.
I have a lot of respect for Frisson.
I've worked with Tally a lot of times.
Great team.
You know, Pat pat really qualified aj super aligned probably the most aligned person from you know off-chain labs
and the foundation team so i i have i i voted for aj too if my with my own delegation, you can check that on chain, too. But there's, you know, I'm
disappointed I lost. But the people that are up there are great, bullish arbitrage. And yeah,
it's gonna it's gonna be great.
Yeah, that's tough. I think it speaks to the popular perception of this kind of protocol is something that's a you know a net negative or
or destructive potentially harmful and dangerous um and it is harmful and dangerous to the status
quo it's harmful and dangerous to the kind of delegates who have already accumulated a lot
of influence and are doing this kind of vote rent-seeking and vote bribery behind the scenes.
Yeah, and I'm not accusing anyone of anything.
It's just there are insiders, and I think that's obvious to everyone.
I don't think anyone would disagree with that.
For sure.
I mean, it's the nature of Tao politics and things like that.
The nature of politics in general.
Right. Yeah, there was a quote by, I think it's Cicero, said that politicians, Cicero was an orator. He's actually never had a primary work. Well, we don't have any of his primary works published, but he was a statesman in, I think it was Rome, it might have been Greece, and you may know this better than I do. But he said that the role of a politician can either be well paid or honorable, but it can't be both.
I read that like 20 years ago and it stuck with me.
That was part of my radicalization toward my current political views,
which are very libertarian, bordering anarchism, maybe agorism resonates.
But regardless of label, I think that concept speaks to the underlying principle of votes being for sale.
the underlying principle of votes being for sale.
And that's why I think a similar but modified form of governance
is probably going to work best for DeFi.
And I'm really excited by Lobbify to, you know,
at watching the evolution of systems that are spurred on by this marketplace.
It's a good quote.
I mean, that really hits.
Personally, I don't see myself as a politician.
I'm simply an engineer.
I'm just a code monkey, you know?
I'm also a governance nerd, but I don't, I really
don't want to be a politician. I am on the city council city that I live in now. Yeah, I wouldn't,
I wouldn't say you are. I think, you know, this is, if anything, I think
lobbyfy democratizes access to governance power. And it not only democratizes, but it sort of meritocratizes, if that could be a
word, gives governance to the people who are willing to pay for it. And as money is the
expression of reciprocal altruism and people's genuine wants quantified, this is going toward the people,
governance power will go toward people, to people who genuinely want it and therefore,
over a long term in a free market toward the people that need it the most. So I'm really
excited to see Lobbify as this kind of market mechanism that allows
for better coordination.
Somebody write that down. New tagline, market system that enables better coordination.
Yeah, someone flip that. Lobbify, hire me for your marketing arm. enables better coordination. Yeah.
Lobbify, hire me for your marketing arm.
Anyway.
I think it's going to be huge, man.
I think there's going to be a whole segment
of GovernPy stuff here soon.
We're going to have a
future key where every DAO
vote has a market, a prediction market that says what is the price of the token if this proposal goes through versus if it doesn't.
We're going to have Lobbify for every delegation, every possible DAO that exists can have automated markets for lobbying.
you know,
DAO that exists can have automated markets for lobbying.
We're going to have backed,
you know,
securities,
U.S.
securities for every fortune 500 company are going to be on chain.
And we're going to create a convex,
you know,
curve style bribe DAOs for every,
every fortune 500 company stock.
We're going to do it.
It's just,
it's inevitable.
The genie's out uh
governify is gonna be huge we're gonna we're gonna take over giant corporations with
dgens we're probably gonna buy the constitution again and um yeah super super bullish on a as it
as a whole like market segment i love that vision and uh yeah i mean to paint like what
the existing system looks like like you can either have what you've described with future key or you
can have blackrock owning the voting rights to all of the shares that are delegated to them
and it's very difficult as a as a an investor to opt out of that system and retain your voting rights.
How much money do I need to 51% attack BlackRock?
Or alternatively, how much money do you need to pay or how much blackmail do you need to have on Larry Fink to get him to vote a certain way and turn your entire corporation into a woke dei
shithole uh you know that's like what we saw the last 10 years basically how the market's going now
i would i'm begging for woke dei shitholes to be running shit
right bring bring back bring back the trans furry gender bender
because the planes are literally crashing into each other without them
yeah there's uh there's an argument to be made for sure um but yeah i love that vision of of
like futarchy and daos being being on prediction markets. We've talked about token
dynamics, talked about DAO governance being prediction market based for a while. We've
started to see this with MetaDAO. They actually had an economic vulnerability recently. Someone
manipulated the TWOP that priced tokens according to the system that you described.
And they caused the vote to go through a certain way. And then they were able to profit from that.
We've got a little bit of a little description on exactly how that happened in our GitHub
repo at Token Dynamics XYZ, the economic vulnerabilities list.
the economic vulnerabilities list. But yeah, I mean, I think that's a good place to sort of segue
into to sign off with. I mean, how do you see Futarki being implemented in society? Like,
do you see Futarki even getting to scale at like the highest levels of government?
Yeah, just I'm working on Nurite. I'm working on a stablecoin right now. Like, getting to scale at the highest levels of government. Yeah.
I'm working on Nurite.
I'm working on a stablecoin right now.
Give me a couple months,
and then we're going to start doing more govern-fied stuff.
And look, all the securities are coming on chain.
Larry Fink already told you everything's going to be tokenized.
It's going to be super trivial to just call the delegate function or figure out
ways to price these things and put them into other types of prediction markets on chain.
Just give it a few months. This stuff is really, really new. It hasn't really existed that long.
You consider that democracy and voting is several thousand years old and DAOs have existed for like seven years.
You had the DAO seven years ago now.
And then Meta Cartel and then MakerDAO.
Like even six years ago, there were only three DAOs that were made.
Four or five, you know.
So we're going
to get there. Just give it some time. It's going to happen, inevitable. And yeah, it's going to
be really fun. Bullish Governify. Thanks for having me on. Appreciate it. Dude, thank you for
coming on. This is a really cool event stream stream I think people underestimate how important this week was in the trajectory of defy and it's just a real
pleasure to be able to speak with you and lobby fi and Eric earlier about this
stuff so I'll give it to lobby fi any last words here before we sign off I I guess the last one would be just a recommendation, an ask from our side, please never call us
a governance attack vector.
We just absolutely hate this.
We're doing everything to prevent governance attacks.
We have actually given up quite a bit of revenue because we've introduced
a kind of a threshold to our auctions in order to prevent any kind of trolling or small-scale
governance attacks.
We really hate this word, we really hate this word bribing.
I don't want to put it in my mouth, but bribing, we absolutely hate this one.
And yeah, I would just basically sign off here.
We are so bullish CarbonFi this year.
And we really hope that this week will be just the beginning of what is yet to see in the coming year.
Thanks for having us on also, Nathan.
Awesome.
Yeah, thanks for being here. It was great talking with you guys. And definitely
sympathize with the terminology. And we'll be workshopping what to describe the event,
because I'm not sure we got consensus around that. But yeah, really appreciate you guys jumping on.
And we'll definitely be talking about this more in the next few weeks in terms of solutions rather than, you know, maybe more generative framing.
listening to us speak and opine about governance, politics, economic security, and GovernFi.
Long live GovernFi and Lobbify.
Looking forward to more of what's to come.
Thanks, guys.
Catch you all later.
Yes, sir.
Thanks, Nate.
Bye-bye. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
