We're just waiting here for some speakers to join and then we'll kick things off.
It would be amazing if you could already share out the space and I can already see Jonny is
Hey, Jonny, how is it going?
I was retweeting the space in a different window and then you called me out.
Thank you so much, Jonny.
I already requested Adam as a co-host.
And just for everyone in the audience, welcome.
We're going to talk today about governance parameters.
And no, it's not as boring as it sounds, I promise.
It's actually really, really interesting.
And everybody that has some aid should really care about that.
And if you don't care about it, it's okay.
But yeah, we're just waiting here for a few more speakers to join.
And maybe before we kick things off, who are actually the speakers here on stage?
So right now, Jonny is here.
And Jenny is also already here.
And we are the governance parameter working group.
But I think, Adam, you are way better equipped in explaining what we are and what we do.
I mean, it's already late Friday.
On Friday, I mean, usually I would be just chilling.
But yeah, hosting a space is also great.
Wouldn't you rather be chilling with us?
It's great to be here with you.
I am, I guess, the head of the parameters governance working group.
And we are a part of the parameters committee for Intersect NBO.
And so we are helping to get community feedback on how the parameters should be set for CIP-1694
and actually for the Voltaire governance of Cardano.
So, as you know, coming up here in the near future, we will be hopefully approving CIP-1694
and transitioning to a community governance model where the holders of ADA will be in charge of the blockchain.
But with great power comes great responsibility, as the uncle of a superhero once said.
Things didn't turn out too well for him, but hopefully that will turn out better for us
because we will all be engaged in running the network together and setting up these parameters.
So, this is going to be a chance for us to look at the system, sort of talk to you about the survey we have put together,
and sort of answer any questions you have about what this looks like.
Perfect. Yeah, thanks a lot, Adam.
And maybe to really take a step back, we can quickly talk about what is CIP-1694 in general?
Like, what is it all about?
I mean, we're supposed to be in the age of Voltaire, but maybe someone in the audience has not yet heard about it.
So, I think a good point to start would also be to just discuss, you know,
what is on-chain governance, what is CIP-1694?
Maybe, Adam, you would also like to shed some light on that or anyone else on the speaker panel.
Sure. So, CIP-1694 is the actual proposal that is setting up the form of governance.
So, for anyone here who doesn't know, a Cardano Improvement Proposal is the guidelines by which we make updates to the network.
So, CIP-1694 is something that started over a year ago.
It was the sort of preliminary draft was released, and it outlined the idea that Cardano could be operated in a new model.
As you may know, Cardano has been run in sort of a federated model that's been slowly decentralizing.
At first, it was the three Genesis organizations that were in charge of shepherding the Cardano ecosystem.
So, you had Input Output Hong Kong, which has rebranded as Input Output Global.
You had EMURGO, and you had the Cardano Foundation that were the three entities.
And it was between those three entities that they ran block validation and they actually produced, you know, each block on the Cardano blockchain.
But then, when we transitioned into the next era, we started having stake pool operators in charge of generating blocks.
So, then all of us who hold ADA had the chance to find stake pool operators who could prove that they were able to have the technical ability to collect transactions and produce blocks.
And the stake pool operators became the block validators of the network.
And what's important there is that the stake pool operators really did take an active role in governing the network.
For instance, you saw that, what, about a year ago, I think, when the input output was ready to push a new node,
but the stake pool operators actually wanted a little bit more time to test it out before they said they would adopt it for block validation.
And they actually forced IOG to say, okay, okay, we'll put it off for a few more epochs to give all of you more time to test it.
So, that was a great healthy exercise in governance, a great healthy exercise in showing that there was a distribution of power forming in the Cardano ecosystem.
So, at this point, where we are now, we have this balance of power where the three genesis entities hold the keys, the genesis keys,
that can update the parameters of the blockchain and initiate hard forks to update the software of the blockchain.
But they can only update the software, including the parameters, if the SPOs agree to it.
So, the SPOs still have to be the ones who install that software on their nodes.
They have to be the ones who agree to operate under the instructions of the Cardano node.
And to say, yes, we're willing to accept your new version, and we're willing to make that the rules of our ecosystem.
What CIP 1694 is saying is we're going to do away with the genesis keys.
No longer will only three organizations, IOG, EMURGO, and the Cardano Foundation be the ones who get to decide if we're going to update the software, if we're going to change parameters.
Instead, we're going to make that a community vote.
We're going to have an on-chain governance mechanism where we will have representatives from the community who give their opinions on any proposal that comes forward.
And the short version is it creates a tri-cameral system, where you have the SPOs, of course, still have their part of the power,
because they're the ones who are operating the block validators.
They are the ones who are running the software.
So they explicitly, in CIP 1694, have the opportunity to vote on things to show what they think before they are asked to make an update to their software.
So they can say whether or not they agree with something before it comes up.
But then you add to it, not only do we have the SPOs doing this, we're also adding a new class of representatives of ADA holders.
And that is the DREPs, the delegate representatives.
Oh, let me stop you right there. DREPs, what a word. Can anybody be a DREP, Adam? Can anyone be a DREP?
That is a great question, and that is up to you to determine, all of you here today.
Because in theory, anyone can be a DREP.
Anybody who has a Cardano wallet will be able to file a certificate that says, I want to be a DREP and I am a DREP.
So here's my Cardano, here's my certificate, here's my DREP certificate that says, I am voting on governance action proposals.
That is going to be a right of all ADA holders, anybody who has a Cardano wallet on the network.
However, there is going to be a parameter set that says, along with this certificate, you also must post a bond, we'll say, of ADA.
And so if you are going to post this escrow, this bond of ADA, then what is that going to be?
Is it going to be like 1.5 ADA, the minimum fee that we would expect to see for just having a wallet or just staking to a pool?
Or is it going to be like 500 ADA, which is what the SPOs are required to post, if I'm not mistaken?
And also for voting too, right, for Catalyst, that's 500 right now.
Or is it going to be, is it going to be a 2000 ADA?
Do we want to say that we want our DREPs to really feel that they have skin in the game?
So they have to take 2000 ADA out of their wallets and put it into an escrow that does not earn rewards.
You don't get staked rewards on this.
And now if you do that, it means people take it really seriously to be a DREP.
On the other hand, not everyone could be a DREP because people might not have at this point in time a thousand dollars laying around to go and put aside.
Or maybe in the future, a lot more than that if the price of ADA goes up in fiat currency.
So that's why we have these questions, right?
That's why we're asking you to give your opinion on these parameters.
Do you want it to be easy for anyone to be a DREP?
Or do you think that it should be a higher barrier to entry because maybe you have a legitimate belief that if somebody wants to stand up and say,
I'm willing to vote for governance actions, they should have some skin in the game.
So I think that that's a philosophical question that has no right answer.
And then the third part of the tricameral system is the Constitutional Committee.
And the Constitutional Committee is some people.
It's hard to describe in traditional governance words.
Some people say it's like a Supreme Court.
Other people could say it's like a Senate.
In theory, the Constitutional Committee is supposed to only determine whether or not a proposal is valid according to the human Constitution that we come up with as Cardano members or not.
And the Constitution is going to be a big focus of this year.
We have an aspiration of having a constitutional convention in Buenos Aires in December.
If that happens and we propose the Constitution and everybody votes to approve it,
then the Constitutional Committee's role will be to make sure that anything that the DREPs pass is also constitutionally valid.
And if it's not, they will veto it.
That's the main role, right? They don't get to decide anything else.
Just make sure that everything is according to the Constitution.
Correct. That's the idea.
But that's why it's so important that we also take a look at the Constitutional Committee and we choose people that are in line with the philosophy.
And so that's why the DREPs get to have a choice on who they get to elect the Constitutional Committee.
And they get to also, if they feel like the Constitutional Committee is not upholding their responsibility,
they can have a vote of no confidence to get rid of the Constitutional Committee and make a new one.
So let me ask you something. What's going to be in this Constitution?
Are the questions that we're asking in this poll part of what's going to be in this Constitution?
Great question, Jenny. The short answer is that that is still being worked out by the Civics Committee of Intersect.
But the part of the Constitution will be a recognition of the parameters that are set.
And the parameters of this survey that we're talking about right now are helping to determine those parameters.
And the Constitution will explicitly say that we are upholding the parameters that are being set by the governance of Cardano.
Okay. I know, Johnny, you have a question, but I just want a little follow up to that.
So that means the questions that we have here today do not necessarily mean that those are like set in stone on what's going to happen.
It's going to help us come up with, you know, take this into consideration, pass it to the committee.
But that's not the only thing that people can do when it comes down to getting the voice heard, right?
They could also participate in Intersect and take that conversation further, right?
If they have anything in particular, they want to say that's not within the poll, correct?
I encourage everyone to also, you know, join Intersect if you want to be a part of the members-based organization, contribute ideas to Intersect committees, participate in any actions that come up.
So hopefully that's an explanation that has been useful, and I haven't gone on too long.
And I just want to make sure that people knew that, you know, this is a poll, right?
This would mean that, you know, what happens in this poll is just that set us down, because it's important for people to understand that things have been changing so much, right?
So you've got to make sure that, you know, set those expectations right.
Yeah, absolutely, Johnny. Thank you very much for bringing this up.
It's very important to mention.
And, right, if you want to find out more about the survey, check out the posts on the, how do you call that?
The Jumbotron, Nicholas, we call it the Jumbotron.
Oh, man, I know it, but yeah, thanks a lot, Johnny.
And yeah, you have your hand up. Do you have something to share?
Yeah, I know that El's had his hand up longer than me, so I'll be very quick.
Yep, just to call the action, as was made by Nicholas, at the top in the Jumbotron, there are links.
There are links to the actual survey.
The survey itself has a series of questions asking you to give your opinion on what the initial settings of the governance system for Cardano should be.
Now, it's going to be confusing because there's a lot of parameters.
Now, in addition to the links to the survey, there are also some breakdowns as to what the different groups of parameters are, and a little bit of an explanation as to what they are.
I've made that this morning and posted it.
So if you have a look at some of the other posts in the Jumbotron, you will also see a little bit of help understanding what those parameters mean.
And then if you want to do further reading, to be as conscientious as possible, there are three links on the survey itself for you to do deeper dive reading into what the survey is asking.
So make sure to have a look at that if you want to educate yourself all the way. El, go ahead, sir.
Thank you, Jonny, and thanks to Jenny, because she threatened my entire family's life if I didn't show up to this space, so appreciate that.
I was going to say a few things. One, in terms of intersect, Adam, they asked me when I signed up, they asked me if I had a LinkedIn, and I said, no, that's for all people.
So I'm just curious if they'll still let me in.
And then I just wanted to ask, what's your thoughts on terms of entry barrier for D reps?
Because where I can test it a little bit in terms of skin on the game is, what if somebody that I respect massively and has really great vision,
it's just broke. You know what I mean? Yeah, I really appreciate having skin in the game, but you look at kind of around the world, and even just to use a random one, let's look at Naira, and you look at average monthly rent for Naira.
It's like 5,000, but that's like four pounds for me. So it's like a real difficult correlation in terms of skin in the game, but then massive deviation from impoverished areas,
and that not necessarily correlate them with somebody's integrity and intelligence, and how much I could respect them as a D rep.
Yeah, that is an excellent question, and it's something that is just systemic to our world, and not just Cardano.
Obviously, it's something that we try to fix with Cardano, with giving representation.
I'll give you my personal opinion, but I try not to let my personal opinion bias me when I'm also looking at what the community is saying and considering all the factors.
My personal opinion is, to start, we should have it as low as possible, because we want to get people started, and as we're starting out, we need to get this bootstrapped. We need to get everybody in.
As we go on, and we get a bunch of D reps signed up, and we get people active, we can start looking at how to adjust that, and the best part is, these are variable parameters.
These are things that are not supposed to stay the same forever. So just because we set something now at the initial outset, we're going to do our best to set what we think should be the initial parameter for minimum viable governance.
Then as we go, we're going to be assessing it, we're going to be trying to figure out how is this working, what would happen if we decide to change something.
We'll hopefully be gauging the opinions of the community and bringing in community wisdom.
If we see that there's a whole bunch of people from wealthier Western countries who are signing up to be D reps, but not doing anything, then perhaps we need to go ahead and raise that price.
But then we should also try to look at how can we make other programs for outreach to say if you are from an area that's not being well represented, that is underrepresented in the ecosystem, but you have a passion for serving and you're making connections, that we're going to help you come up with that.
Because it shouldn't be the case that somebody else can post that bond for you, or loan you the ADA or whatever.
Yeah, I love that answer because that's pretty much what I was thinking, to be honest with you, Adam.
Having that availability between both sides, where I can come in and I'm very blessed to live a Western life, and 500 ADA is not a lot of money to me, thankfully, and a majority of people in Western civilization.
But it would be really great to facilitate a donation campaign for some people that deserve that respect, but can't necessarily facilitate it themselves.
Just to jump in on the back of that, that is something that is technically possible at the moment, because the way it works whenever you're registering your deposit to become a D rep is you're registering your stake key and submitting that money from your wallet, along with having it co-signed by the owner of the D rep key.
So you can have two elements to this. You can have one person paying the deposit, and the other person being the D rep.
And of course, it would be socially acceptable to highlight the fact that that was a sponsored D rep or something like that. That would be a good way to handle it, maybe.
That's amazing, actually. Thank you for informing me on that, Johnny. Is there any way you can make that as a multi-sig then? So you could have multiple people contributing to a degree?
Yeah, well, you could have multiple certificates signed, sorry, multiple stake certificates signed at transactions, so you could have multiple people contribute without having to have a multi-sig. I believe Ryan might be able to back this up.
But the core team told us that Plutidis V3 will support scripts as D reps. So you should be able to do this both the way you're saying, but also directly via scripts, whether it's multi-sig or
a more complicated piece of logic. I would say, Ryan, go ahead. Yeah, Ryan, go ahead. Hi, guys. Can you hear me well? I've never been on Twitter space before. Yeah, we're good, brother.
Okay, cool. Yeah, I just wanted to touch on that registration comment there. My understanding is D registrations, the certificates, they don't need to be signed with a payment key to pay the deposit. It's not a stake key, as well as the D rep key itself.
So I'm not sure you can do this once the D rep is straightforward, as you were describing it, Johnny. I don't know.
Okay, I was based on a conversation I had earlier today with yourself, so that's confusing.
Sorry, so perhaps I explained it poorly. No, the way the D rep deposits work, they're not tied to a stake account at all. So it's unlike stake key deposits, which, you know, exist at the moment, and perhaps people are more familiar with that, you know, you get paid them out back to your stake, back to your stake account at the end of an epoch.
They're done implicitly in the transaction. So you pay the deposit and, you know, sign the UTXO to be locked. It is the way it works, it's not tied to a stake account necessarily at all.
Okay, I need clarification, and I do apologize to go off topic slightly, or it's still within the minds of the topic, I guess. But in CIP 1694, it was described as a deposit that was refundable at the end of the D rep's active participation. Is that no longer the case, if it doesn't come back?
Yeah, so you get the deposit back when you submit a resignation certificate, right? And you do the same way with the implicit UTXOs and such. So you just, when you do, when you design, you just do your outputs as your total inputs plus how much you pay for the deposit.
And then then the system just works out like that. It doesn't get to a stake account or anything like this.
Well, sorry about that. So we're getting into the weeds of technicality, and I apologize. But in any case, if someone is willing to use their payment key instead of their stake key to pay a deposit on behalf of a D rep, and they each sign with their side, so the D rep signs with their key, and the wallet runner signs with theirs, they could effectively pay the deposit on behalf of a D rep. Is that the case, Ryan?
I believe so, yeah. Although, you know, I said this earlier on Discord, I think if you're doing that sort of thing, you have to pass around transaction bodies and get, you know, collect witnesses, right?
Oh, yeah, it's going to be technically. Yeah, it's going to be.
My friends, can we just keep it like technical, like more?
No, I tried to make it as high level as possible by saying it would be possible to do a sponsorship, and then we got into the technical weeds. I think we've concluded that it is possible to do a sponsorship, which was the original statement.
I just want to apologize for bringing this up.
I know. Don't. This is so important. And I also think they could be like, you know, like social, like tools from the community tools that get solved this problem as well, you know?
So also the fact that a D rep can be a script credential or basically a plutus script means that what people can do is they can register sort of like abstaining script credentials and then hand off control of these script credentials to people in less fortunate countries or people who as countries are more impoverished by inflation or whatever.
So you can have sort of a lined up like stack of D reps where then anyone who is having trouble meeting the deposit can just take over one of these script credentials provided.
Maybe they have some proof of identity or maybe just some zero knowledge proof, etc.
So it's actually a pretty nice system that we could have where.
Yeah, thank you for mentioning that. I also want to make sure to mention that because the script credentials can be D reps, this means that you can create a multi-sig where you and a group of friends can be a panel that decides on governance actions together.
And you could all delegate your voting power to that to that multi-sig. And then that could be you could then jointly decide five out of seven votes has to agree to vote on this to make to cast our vote as a D rep.
Or you could have like a DAO and you could make it so that everybody in the DAO has to vote in order to agree on a governance action. So those are also powers that can come in here and how people can form D reps.
Johnny, you wanted to pitch in on this?
Not on this. What I'd like to say is given that we have a limited amount of time in this space, if anybody has had any specific issues or questions come up as a result of trying to engage with the survey, the feedback form, please come up and express your concerns or confusion that you felt as a result of trying to go through the survey as we want to capture any questions that come up and answer them to make it as clear as possible for.
People trying to do it because we want people to do it. Please complete the survey.
Absolutely. We'll get back to the survey. So, Cardano, I see a request for speaker from Cardano Review. So I have just accepted that while they're coming up on stage. I'm going to give Jenny the floor since Jenny has her hand up.
I just wanted to kind of like go back to like the poll that we're having and just to explain a little bit more in detail and what are these guardrails we're trying to define, right?
There's a governance actions and for those who are in the room, they're trying to understand how does that apply to you? Like as a regular ADA holder, you know, is this something that any regular ADA holder can do?
Can you just like submit a governance actions or is this something that has to go through your DRIP? You know, maybe there are people that are wondering how exactly does that relate to them?
And if you wanted to help me translate that, that'd be awesome.
Yeah, sure. So the short answer is that anybody who holds ADA can submit governance action.
Now that governance action will have to be in line with the expectations set forth in order to be considered for it to be taken up or else the Constitution Committee can say like, oh, you aren't like you haven't actually shown us like a justification for how this will affect the network and not have adverse effects.
So they can say like that, that's that justification isn't there. You all you've done is request, you know, 100 million ADA for yourself out of the Treasury. So we're going to declare that to be void.
But I mean, people can request money from the Treasury with a governance action. Whoa. Sounds like we really need guardrails for that, huh?
That's that's part of what these parameters are for.
These guardrails are for. So we have part of the part of the guardrails are defining what kind of deposits go with that.
So I'll just go ahead. I just want to scroll through the survey real quick and tell you the overall categories because I think that maybe that's going to be the most helpful way to start this.
Here are the categories of parameters that we're looking for on the survey.
First, we have parameters that are specific to what types of proposals the stateful operators can vote on.
So this is where the stateful operators have a say within the governance of Cardano, part of that tri-cameral system.
So they get to vote on if there's a motion of no confidence. So what percentage of stateful operators is necessary for them to for us?
Not stateful operators, delegation.
Well, thank you. What percentage of delegation to stateful operators? When I say that, I meant delegation.
So a stateful operator who has, you know, 50 million ADA delegated to them, right, is going to have be representing more ADA holders.
And the reason for this delegation based system is because this is a proof of stake based system.
So stake needs to be the thing that actually determines the things, not just a majority rule of individuals who run stake pools or like multiple stake pools.
That multiple votes won't count. What will count is the total amount of delegated stake.
So in the questionnaire, you're being asked what a threshold should be, a percentage of people in the yes position that will pass a proposal from the SPO side.
That is you setting the percentage requirement of delegation required to pass that proposal.
Yeah. Thank you for making that difference, Johnny. We don't want to have that.
We don't want to let there be some sort of a 51 percent attack where somebody just registers a ton of stateful certificates with five ADA delegated to each in order to make a bunch of fake SPOs in order to take over the network.
So it is by delegation. So when I say stateful operators, I mean by delegation.
So the percentage of delegated stake is what will set these parameters.
So the SPOs help to decide if there's going to be a motion of no confidence to boot the Constitution Committee if necessary.
And also, if they want to form a new Constitution Committee or add a member to the Constitutional Committee, we need those parameters of what percentage of delegated stake to the stake pool operators will pass that, as well as hard fork initiation.
If the SPOs are going to agree to update their nodes, what should be the percentage required to initiate a hard fork?
Then we have the parameters that are specific to the types of proposals that delegated representatives, the DREPs, could vote on.
And Johnny made a nice pie chart that sort of helps to look at this because this is, as CIP 1694 is written, for everybody who has delegated stake to a DREP that is not abstaining.
So one of the ways that you can decide, in order to withdraw your rewards out of your reward account, you have to be delegated to a DREP.
But you don't have to be voting. You can say, I'm going to delegate to the auto abstained DREP. It's an algorithmic DREP.
But if you delegate to the auto abstained DREP, that means that your stake is removed from the equation when it comes to voting.
Let me ask you to just rewind for a minute, Adam, just to make that clear. So do you delegate?
One thing is for you to delegate to your regular SPO for your rewards.
And then you also have to register with a DREP, correct? Those are two separate things.
You can still be delegated to your favorite SPO, even if your favorite SPO is deciding to not become a DREP and vote, right?
And we don't necessarily want SPOs to be. If both an SPO and a DREP, they could.
But it used to be, the way it is currently, is you choose an SPO, and if that SPO produces blocks, you get rewards.
What we're saying now, what we're going to say in 1694 is you have to both choose an SPO and you have to choose a governance representative.
And if you don't feel that any of the people are representing you, then you can choose to abstain by designating the auto abstained DREP.
And that just says, I recognize that there is a governance mechanism for Cardano, so Cardano is community run.
I recognize that, but I am choosing to not be involved.
Unless there's an issue that I do want to get involved in, because you can always come out of that any time you want.
And I think it's also important to mention that anyone can also register themselves as a DREP.
So you can also always represent yourself without having to be on Twitter and flashy about, you know, delegate to me.
You can just, you yourself, just register yourself as a DREP, then vote with your ADA.
If you're a whale, if you're just a normal guy with a few ADA, that's no difference.
You can just also participate and vote the way you want.
That's, I think it's also very important to mention.
And sorry to interrupt you, Adam.
No, no, that's okay. That's an excellent point to make.
Because just because somebody wants to advertise themselves as a DREP doesn't mean you have to choose one of those people.
You can also register yourself as a DREP and represent yourself.
Now, there are some hands up.
I want to ask Cardano review first, because I saw Cardano review's hand go up first.
So my question is, so I'm coming, you know, from this perspective of, you know, an everyday user.
Even though I've been in the space for a minute, there's still a lot that I have to learn.
So when I think Cardano, I think of, I hop in my wallet.
I'm looking here, I've got a Euroi wallet.
I've got a iPhone wallet.
I've got a Vesper wallet.
So I hop in here, and I'm trying to figure out, okay, how do I delegate to a DREP?
And I don't see anything in here.
So I guess my concern is this sounds like something that's going to affect all of the Cardano users.
And there's, you know, Cardano users coming from all different walks of life.
You know, not everybody's on Twitter.
Not everybody is on Facebook or whatever.
So my concern is that, you know, whatever changes are being made is that everybody gets a fair shot,
and that those considerations are made from, you know, from the everyman perspective, you know,
and not just from people who know how to do all the different technical things.
Cardano review, and in response to your question, what I will say is that there is a SIP called SIP95,
which is specifically for the wallet integration with the governance system,
and it will be integrated into wallets in the future.
So before the governance system goes live, there will actually be wallet support and interface
for you to see the governance system and interact with it.
So you won't be left behind.
So this will be something that all wallets will be able to use that integration
and know those standards to be able to show people who can be knee reps
and also how you can register yourself.
And if you want to get tried, if you want to try it out yourself,
you can go to the LACE wallet and try it out on SanchoNet.
Specifically, the website to go to is Sanchogov.tools.
If you go to Sanchogov.tools and then hit the connect wallet button,
it will take you through the steps you need to go through
to join the testnet governance system
and even register as a DRAP on the testnet governance system
and try out voting in advance of the release.
Yeah, and I was just going to add with SIP95,
basically all wallets will support it.
Some of them won't have nice buttons inside the wallet,
but there will be other tools,
already an official tool that you can go to.
So everyone will definitely have representation so long as they want it.
Al, your hand is up. Go ahead.
All right, so I'll go on then with describing the surveys
and then we'll also open it up for more questions and comments.
So as I mentioned, we are asking for the parameters
that are specific to the DRAPs.
And again, the DRAPs will have the most power
within this governance system in terms of setting,
voting on things, of course,
because they are the representatives of the ADA holders
that are supposed to be deliberating on this on a regular basis.
So I mean, everybody does,
but the DRAPs are the most deliberative part.
So the DRAPs, we have to talk about motions of no confidence,
forming the Constitutional Committee.
The DRAPs also look at the Constitution.
Do we want to update the Constitution?
Do we want to have a hard fork?
And then also the parameters for the various groups.
The different parameters get divided up into groups
that deal with the network,
the economic aspects of the Cardano blockchain,
the technical aspects, the governance aspects,
So those are all aspects.
So, Johnny, why don't you go into that?
So speaking of the Jumbotron earlier on,
if you go back across a few of the things that are up there,
you'll see a tweet that was posted earlier today
breaking down what exists within those groups.
So if you're filling in the survey later today,
or hopefully before the expiry date,
you will come to that question of
what is the threshold percentage of delegated ADA
to active DRAPs that you think should be passed
before a network group change to a parameter is made,
and you're sitting there going,
what the hell is the network group?
Yeah, so if you go to the top there
and click on the tweets that are in the Jumbotron,
you will see a breakdown of what parameters exist within each group.
So you'll get an idea and a slight explanation
as to what those parameters mean.
Now, it does get quite technical,
especially in the technical group,
but it is the fact that you'll be able to contribute.
DRAPs will be able to contribute their opinions
as to whether or not a parameter should change.
SPOs will be able to contribute their opinions
as to whether a parameter should change,
which prior to now has only been the purview
of the three kings of Cardano, the Seven Keeks.
And just real quick, Johnny, on this,
if somebody is going through this poll
and there's some of these questions they find like too technical,
but they do want to pitch in on some other ones,
they can just do what they understand
and finish without a problem, right?
I think the forum requires suggestions for all,
there's required fields for all of the dimensional parameters,
not just some, which is why I'm trying to heavily educate people
or point people towards educational resources.
Just the bottom ones are optional?
There's a section of three optional questions
in the forum that are wholly optional,
but what we want is people to submit their actual opinions
on all of the initial settings of governance,
which is why I'm trying my best here
to make sure to highlight the educational resources that exist.
Yeah, I would also just like to highlight once more, right?
I mean, it sounds all very, very complicated, right?
And it sounds a bit scary for especially those
who are not, yeah, are involved in governance
on a daily basis or even on a weekly basis,
but right once we get to that point
when we have the Chang hard fork,
which is by the way, the name of the next hard fork
where governance and Plutus V3
and probably some other things that I forgot now
will be live from mainland,
is that the tooling and the educational material,
of course, also needs to be there, right?
Because we cannot transition into a governance system
without having the right tools,
without having the wallets ready, without being,
yeah, basically ready as a community.
And this survey here, even if you don't know everything
and if you are unsure about how to answer
some of the questions being asked here,
it's still good that you spend some time
and try to understand what's going on,
like how is this gonna affect me?
Hey, is there maybe somebody that knows more than me?
Can I reach out to them for help, for example?
And I would already say, if there are people
who already help you, they might be a good candidate
for a DRAP in the future.
And right, all of this is a process
and I'm really sure that going through it,
we will come out as stronger,
as a better community altogether.
And yeah, this is my opinion
as not the Cardano Community account, but Nicholas.
Yeah, so just wanted to say that.
You know, the way we learn is by doing
and by building together.
And so don't be afraid of putting down an answer
of giving your opinion because, you know,
that's just taking, you know,
just giving us your honest opinion.
We wanted to take it into consideration.
So yeah, before we move on, I'll ask Jose.
I just wanted to ask, you were earlier mentioning
that there is a out-of-stain option
if you want to remove yourself
from taking a position on a certain proposal
And then you were saying that by taking that position,
I saw a few days ago a post mentioning
that you take yourself out of the equation.
So you're giving the other people more power
because it's less data in the game.
how is that different from not borrowing at all
or not getting engaged with the governance system?
Oh, I can feel this if that's okay.
Let me give my optimistic answer
before you jump into yours, Johnny.
So the way that the governance,
the way that CIP 1694 is written right now
is there needs to be a threshold to pass.
So of all the people who have said,
I'm registered as a D-Rep and I'm ready to vote on this
and this is the amount of governance,
keep in mind, this is the amount of governance stake.
So you have governance stake
that is little adas, little lovelaces technically,
that are delegated to certificates held by people who say,
we are ready to vote on proposals.
That delegated stake makes up a certain amount of ADA.
So let's say like 10 billion ADA just for a round number.
And that's the amount of governance stake.
Now, if we say that 51% is how much is needed,
or 50.1% is how much is needed to pass,
that's just over 5 billion ADA needs to approve
a measure for it to be actually adopted into Cardano.
So anybody who votes no or anybody who doesn't vote
basically is not contributing to the yes votes
that would get that over the threshold to pass that.
Now, the reason why there's only 10 billion ADA
in the active governance stake
is because there's all this other ADA out there
where people have specifically decided to auto abstain, perhaps.
They've all said, I'm going to auto abstain
because I don't want to participate in governance at this time.
Maybe if there's a proposal that's really important to them,
they'll come out of auto abstain to vote on it.
But they don't want to be involved right now.
Now, if you are registered as a DRAP
and you have a bunch of ADA
and then you see that there's a vote
that you don't want to have a part of,
you can just cast an abstained vote.
If you cast a vote that is abstained,
that lowers the amount of active governance stake
So it means that there's less of a threshold
So that is the thinking of why we're going to do it this way,
because there's a certain amount of people
who are actively involved in governance
and we're going to get the approval of that amount of people to vote.
It's where basically there's a quorum that's been met
by people saying, I'm on the network, I'm here to vote.
Now, can you get the proper percentage threshold
to actually get it going?
Yeah, your specific question is the difference
between abstaining and not voting.
And I think Adam covered that there,
but I'll just say it as simply as possible.
If there's a DRAP on the system
that you've delegated your ADA to,
just like you would delegate your ADA to a stake pool,
and they haven't yet voted on a proposal,
that lack of a vote has the same weight as them voting no.
your delegated ADA is weighted in the no position
and is helping to prevent that proposal from passing.
So if you were in auto abstain,
you wouldn't have any effect at all,
but if you're delegated to a DRAP that hasn't voted yet,
you're effectively helping them vote no
until they decide to say yes.
So one interpretation of that would be
that you're protecting things from changing
by delegating to a DRAP that hasn't voted yet,
because you're making it more difficult
for that proposal to pass.
So we'll actually get into that a little bit more
in the optional questions.
But working down the list,
the next category I'll highlight is
the parameters specific to the costs
within the governance system.
And this is what we touched on at the beginning.
There is a gov action deposit
and a DRAP deposit parameter that can be set.
Again, variable parameters.
And this is the amount of ADA
along with either a governance action
or with a DRAP certificate
that when you want to register yourself to be a DRAP.
So let's say that you're afraid
that there's going to be a whole bunch of people
who are going to be going and requesting
a million ADA for themselves from the treasury.
Maybe that means you're going to decide
that you're going to set the gov action deposit high.
That might be a rational thing to decide.
well, we'll just build a system
that will screen out all of those
really BS governance action proposals
because we're not going to give somebody
a million ADA for doing nothing.
But we do want somebody from an underrepresented area
who doesn't have a lot of ADA
to be able to propose a governance action.
So we're going to set that really low.
So those are the kind of considerations,
the kind of trade-offs you want to give.
And then the same deal with the DRAP deposit.
Do you think there's going to be too many DRAPs
that you want to sort of weed out the unserious ones,
somebody who decides one night when they've had a few drinks?
I'm going to go sign up right now.
Or do you want to slap them with,
like, hey, this is how much ADA
that you don't get to get rewards on,
and then make them think about it,
and then only the serious people apply.
So that's what those parameters are for.
The next group that we ask about
is parameters that are specific to the links
of items within the governance system.
And so this is the length of the constitutional committee terms.
How long can constitutional committee members serve
before they expire and they rotate off?
How long will a governance action stick around?
So if somebody makes a governance action,
will it be around for five epochs?
Will it be around for 18 epochs?
How long do you want that to be?
If DRAPs don't vote for a certain number on anything,
for a certain number of epochs,
they get dropped from the active roster.
And we say you're not doing your job,
so all of the governance stake that is delegated to you
is now recognized as abstained votes
because you're not doing your job of participating in governance.
So how many epochs of activity,
or how many epochs of no activity
is a DRAP allowed before they are dropped from the active roster
and regarded as an abstained vote?
The final section of the parameters that we want
are looking to figure out.
Our parameters is specifically to the constitutional committee.
So we need to figure out the minimum size
of the constitutional committee.
How many members do there need to be
of the constitutional committee?
Do we just need a handful, or do we need a bunch of them?
What should be the total number of the constitutional committee?
So this would be the ideal number.
If we fall below the minimum,
the governance stops because you have to recruit more.
But ideally, how many should there be in total?
And then what should be the threshold
of constitutional committee members voting on things?
So if you say we need at least five members
of the constitutional committee,
ideally we will have seven.
Maybe we say there's a five of seven threshold.
A threshold of five, a minimum of five, a total of seven.
So that we have five, seven members.
And when you say thresholds here,
just to confirm for the room, what do you mean?
By threshold, I mean the total number of yes votes
that are needed from constitutional committee members
For it to be considered constitutional,
So there is a potential use case here
where the constitutional committee has jumped in quickly
at the beginning of a proposal
and said this is a constitutional proposal
and let the vote continue.
And in which case it doesn't pass
until the other thresholds are met
in the SPO or DREP or both side of things,
depending on the thing that is being proposed.
So it's all a very elegant system,
but also a little bit confusing at times, right?
So make sure to read any documentation.
And just for any future listeners to this space,
because you won't be able to see the Jumbotron,
what I'm doing right now is I'm writing a little thread
of things that were posted in the Jumbotron
so that you can do some further reading
or go to the actual form itself,
because we haven't given a link in voice.
So if you go to the comments under this space
whenever you're listening back
and go down to my thread of comments,
you will see a link to the form itself,
and you can fill in your opinions before it closes.
Just want to capture that as well.
Yeah, and I'll just say it real quick.
MVG, as in minimum viable governance,
It's a pretty nice little short yard.
It's like the web 2.0 days, man,
where there's no vitals, right?
You could have said A.io,
but that's not what it is.
Maybe we could just to really wrap things up
and go through the whole process for users.
Like, maybe we could think about this whole process
of, you know, what does it mean?
submitting a governance actions,
voting on the governance action,
and then enactment and all of that.
Maybe we could go through this life cycle
and then also explain where parameters apply,
because I think that would help people
also to understand a bit.
Like, what are these parameters
and where are they actually needed, right,
in this whole life cycle of governance?
Let's do that right after I ask the Gold Rush to speak,
because I saw the Gold Rush with their hand up.
I probably misunderstood something,
but, okay, it sounds like if a dREP doesn't vote,
that equates to effectively a no.
But if they don't vote for enough time,
they get switched to abstain,
which basically takes their power out of the pool
and allows the other dREPs to make the decision.
But if we end up in a situation,
you know, I'm thinking about stake pools,
and I'm thinking about, I forget what we call it,
like basically abandoned stake.
You know, you see stake pools closed down
and you see people just leave their delegation
And so I imagine that's going to happen with dREPs as well.
And so if we end up with dREPs that aren't doing their job
and people who aren't moving their stake around,
we're going to end up with a bunch of dREPs
and a bunch of voting power that could be,
like orphan delegation, right?
And those would, I'm just trying to think,
would that create a vector of,
would that create a problem if over time
we end up in a situation where there are dREPs
that are registered that are all abstained,
they end up getting flipped to abstain.
Like you end up with a bunch of power concentrated
in the hands of a few dREPs that are actually doing their job,
which I guess could be a plus,
but can you think of any minuses for that?
Can anybody, can anybody educate people in the room
think of any minuses for that?
Well, I will just say that that is something
And one possibility is that we could
completely like void those certificates
and then say that people who are delegated
to those dREPs aren't able to withdraw their rewards.
So all of a sudden they realize,
oh, hey, my dREP hasn't been doing their job,
That's a conversation for down the road, I think,
because we still have to figure that part out.
But what you have said is a concern that has been discussed
and it is very much stuff that we're thinking about.
But what we have set up right now is what's being proposed
for minimum viable governance to get us started.
And then if in a year from now we discover
there's a whole bunch of dREPs who aren't doing their jobs,
we will have to address it.
Actually, my question wasn't the same sense
that the Gold Rush just mentioned.
And it seems like a probable solution would be
for delegation to be not permanent,
to be able to delegate and then delegate for a year
or for five years or 10 years, whatever time is set.
But there's no parameter for that.
And I was wondering if there is a space within the survey
or to add it for those kinds of parameters.
So parameters that are actually missing
that would be convenient to have such as this one,
So we don't have anything set up on this particular one.
We do have three additional questions
that explore different parameters.
Not this in particular, though.
Yeah, it's always good to record these ideas
and these thoughts because, as Adam said,
this is minimum viable governance.
This is what's been deemed sort of the path.
If anything is easy enough to add
and also sort of significant enough idea,
it may be added in the Chang hard work.
the understanding is there's not really any new scope
being defined as of this point.
we need to clarify what these parameters should be.
And then also, if there's any ideas
about other parameters that should exist,
it's something that we should take note of
And then that way, it can be hopefully implemented
in the hard fork afterwards, like the hard fork after Chang.
And when you said you're gonna record it,
wouldn't this be something to address
to the committee itself, like an intersect?
Should we encourage people to join?
And that's pretty much the place to go, right?
In fact, these are things that, since we are...
The group that is hosting this Twitter space
is the governance parameters working group.
And we are writing a report
for the parameters committee as a whole.
And so this is something that we will be including
And we'll be able to say,
not only did we as a group discuss it,
we had it brought up from community feedback.
So the community is concerned about it.
There's many things that can be brought up in intersect.
If you join intersect, it's quite an interesting place to be.
I ended up in a working group
and on this space as a result of being in that there area.
So things can happen that you don't expect.
But in any case, the thing today
So again, if there's anybody who's actually had experience
trying to fill in the forum and has hit a block,
just got confused, wants to clarify something,
understanding about one of the questions that they're looking at,
they feel conscientious enough to stop and ask a question,
please come up and ask that question
if you've had that experience with the forum so far,
because we're here today to field and help with anything
that's blocking you from giving a response.
And I want to do what Nicholas suggested
and do a scenario where we talk through some of these parameters
as in the life cycle of what might be a governance life cycle.
And everyone else up here on speaker,
feel free to jump in if I miss an opportunity to say one.
So let's say that Jose decides that he wants to represent himself
in voting on Cardano's governance.
So what Jose will do is Jose will go and will register
a DREP certificate, and that is going to be determined.
He'll have to make a deposit.
That's going to be determined by the DREP deposit variable,
which is set by us when we set these variables.
So Jose is going to have to pay 3 ADA
for the DREP deposit variable, let's say,
in order to make that certificate.
Once Jose has a certificate,
he can then delegate his governance stake to himself.
So now he is a DREP voting with his own governance stake.
And then he says, you know what?
A lot of people have multiple wallets,
and this is a way to have your ADA
that's spread across different wallets
all be delegated to yourself
without having to move it to a central location.
You can leave it distributed across all of your existing wallets
and then delegate back to your DREP that you've just set up
without having to move your money.
So this is one of the beauties of the system,
is people can delegate from multiple wallets
and even split their vote.
They could split their ADA up to different wallets
to delegate to different DREPs they like,
just like you can with stake pools.
So if you want to have a more split way
of doing things, that's possible.
But if you want to set yourself up as a DREP
and have all of your wallets support yourself,
you don't have to move any ADA.
You just need to delegate back to yourself.
So Jose decides he's going to set all of his wallets
delegating to his DREP certificate on his main wallet.
And then he realizes he doesn't want to open himself to doxing.
So he starts advertising himself as a DREP
to make sure that some other people delegate to him too
so he can hide his wallets in the crowd
of people who are delegating to him
and have a little bit of privacy.
So he's now going to become a public DREP
and there's a few dozen people delegating to him.
So he's built up a pretty decent little amount
of governance stake to vote with.
But he needs to realize that there is a
GovActionLifetime parameter.
If he does not vote on things,
if he doesn't do his job as a DREP,
after a while all of that governance stake
Because we need our DREPs to be voting.
We need our DREPs to be looking at the actions
that are proposed and deciding how they're going to vote.
So he makes sure to vote on as many proposals
as he thinks are important
because he also knows that if he doesn't vote on something
then it will not, those things will not,
his vote, his power will not be contributing
to the thresholds that are needed to pass.
Well, it will be contributing.
It will just be contributing in the negative position.
It will be in the double position.
Well, I'm taking the philosophical view
that not contributing is, that contribution is positive.
So he's not contributing.
So he's not contributing.
So you can look at it both ways.
So he's not contributing to things being able to pass
if he doesn't vote on them.
And if he wants, if he doesn't care one way or the other,
he just wants other people to decide
he will actively abstain from things.
Or if he wants to make sure he keeps his governance action
from expiring, then he will go ahead and vote no on things
so that he stays active as a DREP.
In fact, he probably should vote no on things
just to make sure he's signaling to everybody.
So if, now he's also going to need to help decide
on the Constitutional Committee.
So there are thresholds for the Constitutional Committee.
And then he's also going to have to decide
Yeah, I apologize for butting in.
And that's mainly what I wanted to say.
What I was trying to get out is that
I don't think it's worth time to argue over semantics
when we all agree on the fundamentals of the mechanics.
So once a governance action has been passed by the DREPs
or in addition to the governance actions being passed by the DREPs,
they may also need to be approved
by either the Constitutional Committee
or the state cooperators.
And if you want to know which actions are subject to that,
follow Mike Cornyn up here in the speaker role.
He has some awesome infographics that will map that out.
Mike, did you have a video you said that was really, really helpful?
You can advertise it, baby.
If not, people don't know it's there.
There's a three-minute, 41-second video in the Jumbotron
but this seems to be more of a comical video about our time with scripts.
I'm looking for a longer video.
There's a link to the full video there.
So there's a clip from the full video in the Jumbotron link
and then there's a link to the full video.
There's a workshop Mike and I and others attended
where people were discussing all of these things in another form
So you can have a look at that.
It lasts for one hour and 55 minutes, so enjoy.
So there's lots of resources out there for you to see.
So now that Jose has a D-Rep,
he now gets to see if the SPOs
or the Constitutional Committee takes up their role
and also agree that you pass their threshold,
whether that be the Constitutional Committee threshold
or the SPO threshold as appropriate.
And if it passes those, then it will go into action
upon the end of the epoch in which it passes the thresholds
of the appropriate bodies of governance.
So that's kind of walking through and giving you an idea
of how some of these different parameters take place
So I'm going to go with Mike first
and then I'm going to go to Hosky because I see hands up.
I think Cardano review was first.
Oh, it was just a precision.
It's not going to take long.
Just to be sure, you can be a delegator or just a simple aide
or older to submit the confidence action
if you have the funds for the deposit.
So you don't have to be a D-Rep, an SPO,
or a Constitutional Committee member
to submit a governance action.
All you need is your state credentials and that's it.
Indeed, anyone can submit a proposal.
What you're determining in the survey though,
which we're focusing on today, is what that cost should be.
So one of the questions in the survey is,
what should the cost be of a proposal on chain
from anyone on the network?
So that's one of the things you're being asked for
Okay, and I'm told Cardano review is next.
So I guess my question when it comes to voting,
essentially it looks like after you sign up to be a D-Rep,
and then correct me if I'm wrong,
what I'm understanding is then that's when you can vote
either yes or no on the proposal.
Is that what I'm understanding?
You have direct voting par once you register as a D-Rep.
You have indirect voting par
when you're delegating to your chosen D-Rep.
They will be voting on your behalf
and you will have to keep an eye on their record of voting
to see if it aligns with your positions.
If it doesn't, you can choose a different D-Rep
just like you can choose a different stake pool,
If you find yourself in the position
of being incredibly frustrated
because no D-Rep has the same way you look at things,
then you can register yourself as a D-Rep
and just vote how you feel
as long as you can cover the deposit, of course.
And if you hate everything,
you can designate the auto motion of no confidence D-Rep
to vote no confidence on the entire system.
Yeah, so let's get into the weeds of that briefly.
There is a no confidence D-Rep.
If you want everything to fail,
no proposals to pass on the system
to be shut down at any possible moment,
the no confidence D-Rep will always vote no
or have the par of no on any proposal
And if any proposal goes on the system
to shut down governance via a motion of no confidence,
it will vote yes on that motion of no confidence
and support shutting down the system.
So if you really don't like Cardano governance
and the way it's implemented,
no confidence D-Rep will be the way to go.
Poski, you got your hand up.
That was a little biased, but it's okay.
That's legitimately what it's for,
I'm saying, if you have that position...
I mean, the perspective is a little...
I think what John was trying to say
is that there is an option that you can say,
no, I hate this whole thing, shut it down.
No confidence is no confidence.
It's just about having the option.
It doesn't mean that, you know,
like governance in general,
maybe how things are being run
or how things are being handled,
but you still believe in governance.
And that's why you're doing what you're doing.
Shut the system temporarily
until you can get the people in you want in.
I will say the vote of no confidence
that's very reminiscent of this scene in Star Wars
where the Princess Amidala was like,
she voted no confidence in the system,
which there are times when that is a needed...
You know, you need to vote like that.
Not every election or anything that needs to be like that.
But my question is, though, is, is there...
Like, how easy would that be for a Cardano user
Like, what are those requirements?
That's what we're voting on here, yeah.
Literally, you press the button,
you press the button to register,
and then you pay the necessary ADA.
So it's going to be as hard as it is
that we all get to decide.
The survey is asking you what that cost should be,
and it's a deposit cost in ADA
that you can determine in your response in the survey.
And as Adam has said, it is a click away.
If you follow Nicholas's video in the Jumbotron,
you can play around on SanchoNet
and register yourself as a DRIP
and do that whole scenario,
that deposit money from the test data you have,
register as a DRIP, and then start voting.
And if you really want to become a DRIP
and you don't know where to start,
So he'll do anything to get you in there.
And I was hoping, talking over him,
he'd go away, but he's still here.
So we should let Hosky say something.
All right, so when it comes to the DRIP option,
so we have the auto abstain option,
which is the one I'm most interested in,
because it requires you to do,
basically, quote, unquote, nothing
other than cast the vote that you're abstaining.
So you're telling me that I could become a DRIP,
that automatically, if you choose to delegate to me,
I basically, quote, unquote, participate in governance
by not actually participating.
No, well, you could do that if you set up your own abstained script.
But no, this would be where you don't become a DRIP.
It would be, you say, my DRIP is the auto abstained DRIP.
Okay, then, but can a DRIP be run as a DRIP
for the purpose of abstaining?
Yes, as long as they actively do abstain every time.
So they'd have to live up to their own statement.
So I, as one who plans to run as the abstain,
the abstinence DRIP, just have to participate
in every governance action and abstain.
You would have to actively abstain, yes.
And you can set up a script, as Adam says,
to do that for you. Just let it run.
Proact, I will be the pro-abstinence candidate.
Hey, there's all kinds of ways of governance, Hosky.
Yeah, thank you so much for that.
And really, I just want to also give a huge shout out
to the Altair Governance Parameter Working Group.
Jenny, Adam, Mike, Johnny, Riley, Oscar, Oscar West.
He's not here yet, but Oscar, we appreciate you.
And really, everyone that's working on this
whole governance journey, right?
And I just want to give also really a shout out
to all of you and really thank you so much
for all that you do for Cardano.
And yeah, and just to be conscious of time,
we're already a bit over, like 13 minutes over.
So RIC, you have your hand up and Crypto Kev.
So yeah, maybe let's end it with your questions, Riley.
Yeah, I'll be super quick.
I was just going to say you could actually have
a Plutus script that is written to only allow
And then you could have that be the D-Rep.
So you could have this auto abstained script
actually be a script, Mr. Hosky, sir.
That's all I was going to say.
Awesome. I appreciate you, R.
Thank you very much, Crypto Kev.
All right. Thank you very much, Cardano community.
Shout out to Jenny, Tia Jenny, for co-hosting.
Also, Adam, you guys have an amazing panel.
You guys had an ellip here.
Also, Riley, smart, intelligent, young fellow
who kicks it with the Deejins.
Also, Johnny, smart, intelligent, young fellow
who kicks it with the Deejins
and who has some type of microphone attached to his ear.
I may just get young as a descriptor, but thank you.
I just wanted to shout out to anybody who needs a D-Rep.
I will hold the D-Rep you.
And if you need to, you can hit me in the DMs.
That is what El told me a D-Rep is.
So no shame in your game.
And I also volunteered to be Porky Island's D-Rep.
I posted something up top.
And thank you guys for updating us and keeping it fun
and entertaining and not too techy today.
And Crypto Kev, you did ask in the comments earlier
what is a D-Rep, and you seem to have been corrupted
So I'll just do a quick definition.
A D-Rep is a delegated representative,
much like a stake pool operator,
that you can delegate your Aida to
without giving up your Aida.
And it gives your voting power to them on your behalf.
Just like staking to an SPO,
you can change your delegation over time.
It will still take the two epoch transition period,
But you will be able to change who you support
based on how they vote, which is very new in governance.
That's not something I've ever seen before,
being able to change who you support
after you've supported them.
So you can actually hold them to your count.
And I find that to be the most fascinating thing
about the Cardano governance system myself.
And Crypto Kev mentioned he wants to be the D-Rep
And I would say I hope every project,
every group, every DAO, every club on Cardano
will register their treasuries to participate
and allow their membership to decide
how those treasuries are done.
And script addresses can be D-Reps
or delegate to a D-Rep certificate.
It would be a fascinating...
Can I just say something real quick, Johnny?
Because I know I want to be respectful with time, too.
And I just want to ask Nico,
if we do have time to at least go a little bit
over the optional questions,
because I think that's important.
Well, I say that, but Adam will do it.
I've got them open right here.
So I'm going to tell you what the three optional questions are.
The first optional question is a scenario
where we explain how we talked about in here
that right now, if everybody who has registered
as a D-Rep votes on a proposal
and it crosses the threshold,
and the right percentage of people say,
yes, I approve this, it should pass, and it passes,
and right now, at the very first epoch
in which it passes, it will be approved.
And it doesn't have to wait
for the entire governance action lifetime,
which might normally be, let's say, six epochs.
Now, the downside of that is maybe there are people
who are opposed to that who are in the auto abstain camp.
On the other hand, it might be a good thing because...
And the reason why they might be in the auto abstain camp
is maybe they want to come out of auto abstain to vote against it.
But on the other hand, there are some things
that we need to pass quickly.
So do we want to leave it alone?
Do we want to let things pass quickly?
Do we want to have it go the whole time
so that auto abstain people can come out
to vote against it if necessary, or for it if necessary?
Or do we want to make a second parameter
called perhaps a supermajority,
where if a supermajority approves it,
it gets to be enacted at the end of the epoch.
Otherwise, it goes for the whole governance action lifetime.
The second additional question is that there's basically
a threshold that needs to be approved.
We talked about how abstain votes.
If somebody votes abstain, it will lower the amount of yes votes.
This question is, well, instead,
should we do something like a quorum?
Should we say that there actually needs to be
a minimum amount of active voting stake delegated to the DREPs?
So if enough people aren't delegating DREPs
and too many people are on auto abstain, basically,
then actions cannot pass.
The reason for that is we don't want an extreme minority, perhaps,
to be able to make decisions for the whole.
Or do we think that this is a good thing,
because if too many people don't go into auto abstain,
then we need the people who are around
to still be able to make decisions.
And then the final additional question is,
currently, the Constitution Committee has the ability
to vote on threshold levels of motion of no confidence
So if the DREPs want to lower the barrier
to be able to get rid of the Constitution Committee,
the Constitution Committee can basically block them and say,
no, no, no, you have to pass a really high threshold.
We're not going to let you lower that barrier.
Should we remove that power from the Constitution Committee?
Should we say, no, the Constitution Committee
should not have the ability to vote on those thresholds?
Or should we say, yes, the Constitution should have the ability
because it's their responsibility to determine
if a governance action is constitutional?
So those are the three additional questions.
We're not saying that we can't address them.
We're just saying that these are things that we want
to get your opinion on because they may or may not
be able to be considered right now
and they may or may not be things
that we consider in the future.
It is very important to note, Adam,
that they are wholly optional questions.
If you don't have an opinion either way,
those are ones you can completely skip
and just submit the survey.
So if you don't really understand,
or if you do understand but you don't really know
what your position is, you can't just skip them.
And we're running out of time, so Jose?
Yeah, just a quick word on Husky's question
about DRAP being able to auto abstain.
so I just went into CentralNet as you were speaking
and I am registered in CentralNet as a DRAP.
And I went and delegated to the auto abstain
So I am now auto abstained as a DRAP.
Your DRAP isn't your own wallet value.
I'm not sure your DRAP is.
is it just his wallet balance that is delegated to auto abstain
or is it also his DRAP that is delegated to auto abstain?
Oh, Mike, the former dictator of CentralNet is here
and ready to answer that question.
Yeah, so pretty much these are different set of keys.
So you cannot delegate DRAP ID to another DRAP.
So what you would be doing is delegating your own stake,
the money that you personally own to that DRAP
without influencing the people that delegated to your DRAP
because they get to decide who to delegate to.
So essentially all you've done there, Jose,
and the interface may not be very clear.
All you've done is taken your 9,900
and whatever you had left in your own personal wallet
and delegated that to auto abstain.
Your DRAP continues to have any support that it had before
and continues to be in the no-weighted vote position
until you vote yes or abstain.
So potentially what I could do is I could vote one way
with my own wallet and then vote a different way
with the delegation I have.
With your own money, you can delegate to any other DRAP.
Yeah, you don't have to delegate to yourself.
So you can vote on actions as a DRAP
and I could have my wallet delegated to you
so that you are voting for me,
but your wallet could be delegated to the auto abstain
and you're not voting for yourself.
You're only voting for me and the other people
who have delegated to you.
That's something to discuss in the code conversations.
DRAPs have been voting on their own behalf
because they should be able to pick with their own ideas.
I want to let Mike have the last word
and then we're going to close out
because we're past time and we do need to wrap up.
All right, so if there's any questions, any questions,
and by any questions, I mean anything, really,
that you might have that nobody
or that you didn't get answers for.
I actually wake up in the middle of the night
to answer my DMs, so it's a 24-7 service free.
Anything, you want to build a node,
you want to join SanchoNet,
either way from the wallet provider
or by yourself with the CLI.
I take the time that is required to help you.
So make sure to DM, send a DM, join our Discord,
and we're going to help you with that.
Do you have something you want to close with?
do you guys have anything you want to close with?
Yeah, I just want to make sure that we address
for how long we're going to be having this poll going
and what people expect after that.
So we had originally set the poll to go for one epoch,
so it was going to be closing at the end of epoch 464,
which is going to be the 4th of February at 2145 UTC,
but we have extended it for one additional epoch,
because we talked with the parameters committee
and they said, get as much input as you can
and just submit your report when you can.
So we are going to run this until the 9th of February,
So we're going to keep pushing it until then
for the next, what, eight-ish days.
Let everybody know that we've got a week to do this,
and we want to get your opinion, please.
And do you think that if we can,
I'm not saying that we're going to,
but maybe we can try to squeeze in another space
so we can address more stuff?
Yeah, I'm up for another space, yeah.
Well, we'll let you know.
Keep your eyes peeled, people.
We're going to do what we can.
And just to close it out, properly close it out,
remember, if you're listening back to this space,
there are comments underneath it.
So go look at those comments.
You will see a thread in my name
that goes through things that were in the Jumbotron,
things like the link to the survey form itself
the better definition of what the different groups
and a little bit of information
about what those parameters mean,
so you get some context for your vote,
a link to a video for how to join SanchoNet from Nicholas,
so you can play around with governance
and get an action experience-based opinion,
and a link to the workshop that was done by myself
and Mike Horning about a week or two weeks ago now.
I think you'll have a nice basis to fill in the form,
and you have more time to look at these things now,
Awesome. Thank you so much, everyone, for joining this space.
Thank you to my co-hosts,
to the Voltaire Governance Parameter Committee,
to Intersect Cardano Foundation, IOG,
and to everyone in the Cardano community.
and I hope you have a great weekend,
and don't forget to participate in the survey.
I will be crying if you don't.
Please justify our existence.
Please justify the existence
of the Governance Parameters Working Group
by participating in their feedback form.
That would make us feel like we're validated
and have a reason to exist.